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What Do We Owe Future Generations?
Neil H. Buchanan*
I. Introduction: Our Grandchildren and Us
Every decision that we make today can either directly or indi-
rectly affect the interests of future generations, both those generations
already born and those to be born in the decades and centuries after
we are gone.  Even if it is unlikely that many of our decisions (espe-
cially the smaller ones) will affect the general course of history, the
possibility of doing so imposes a profound obligation on us at least to
consider how our policy choices might affect our children, our
grandchildren, and those who will follow.  Not every policy choice
must elevate the concerns of future generations over those of current
generations, of course, but a conscious acknowledgement that we are
making decisions for people who cannot speak for their own interests
creates a moral imperative to give voice to the voiceless.
This Article explores the content of that moral imperative, find-
ing that we currently fall well short of our responsibilities in many
areas but—surprisingly—that we might well be overemphasizing the
interests of future generations in others.  The fundamental problem
that we face is not a future with too little prosperity but a future (and
a present) in which prosperity is concentrated in far too few hands.
This Article thus emphasizes that an obligation to consider future peo-
ple’s needs and desires can fit within well-known conceptions of dis-
tributive justice.
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Because of these moral obligations that carry forth from genera-
tion to generation, concerns about the well-being of future genera-
tions loom large over discussions of public policy.  From politicians to
pundits,1 from analysts at serious policy think tanks2 to scholarly writ-
ers,3 the notion that current generations have obligations to the fu-
1 There is a seemingly unlimited supply of quotations from politicians, pundits, think
tanks, and serious scholars decrying a perceived tendency of current policymakers to ignore the
interests of future generations and thus to harm a defenseless class of future citizens.  Among
many examples of pundits and politicians invoking the interests of future generations, see, for
example, Al Franken, Addictions and Mr. Reagan, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 1998, at A31 (“[A]ll the
while [President Reagan] was taxing our children and grandchildren and spending like no other
President ever has or probably ever will again.”); Scarborough Country (MSNBC television
broadcast Feb. 17, 2005) (comments of Hugh Hewitt), transcript available at http://
www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6993104 (“Republicans led by George W. Bush are laying out reasona-
ble alternatives to fix a major problem that will affect everyone’s children and grandchildren.”);
Scarborough Country (MSNBC television broadcast Sep. 7, 2004) (comments of Joe Scarbor-
ough), transcript available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5942259 (“You know what I say to
these Republicans and Democrats that [sic] are willing to bankrupt future generations?  I’d say,
read ‘Animal Farm.’  You’re no better than the pigs in ‘Animal Farm.’”); id. (“I think John
McCain may be the only rational person left in Washington when it comes to protecting future
generations from this [government] debt.”).  Note that Franken, a former comedian who became
a political pundit, became the junior United States Senator from Minnesota in 2009 after the
Minnesota Supreme Court rejected Norm Coleman’s challenge to the election, see Al Franken
for Senate, Meet Al, http://www.alfranken.com/pages/meet_al/ (last visited July 5, 2009); Perry
Bacon, Jr., Franken Wins Senate Battle, WASH. POST, July 1, 2009, at A1, and Scarborough, who
has a talk show on MSNBC, is a former U.S. Representative from Florida, Joe Scarborough:
MSNBC Host of Morning Joe, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/3080460/ (last visited July 5, 2009).
The line between pundits and politicians, in other words, can be blurry.
2 See, e.g., infra notes 62–63 and accompanying text.
3 Legal scholars regularly invoke the interests of future generations; my own work in-
cludes explicit references to intergenerational obligations, raising the questions that ultimately
led me to write this Article. See Neil H. Buchanan, Social Security, Generational Justice, and
Long-Term Deficits, 58 TAX L. REV. 275, 285, 322–25 (2005) [hereinafter Buchanan, Long-Term
Deficits] (“The question is how to think about the future—what we would like to bequeath to
future generations and how best to deliver it.”); Neil H. Buchanan, Is It Sometimes Good to Run
Budget Deficits? If So, Should We Admit It (Out Loud)?, 26 VA. TAX REV. 325, 350–52 (2006)
[hereinafter Buchanan, Good Deficits]; see also Cheryl D. Block, Pathologies at the Intersection
of the Budget and Tax Legislative Processes, 43 B.C. L. REV. 863, 925 (2002) (“[E]ven in times of
surplus, Congress has an obligation to future Congresses and to future generations to leave the
surplus available to cover unforeseen costs, such as those of social security and the like.”); Brett
M. Frischmann, Some Thoughts on Shortsightedness and Intergenerational Equity, 36 LOY. U.
CHI. L.J. 457, 459–60 (2005) (“It is rather easy to understand that we ought to care for our own
future and thus condemn shortsighted decision-making that will come back to haunt us. . . .  [I]t
seems that the present generation has mastered the art of pushing the costs of shortsighted deci-
sions onto future generations (stop for a moment and think about any of the following: Social
Security, the National Debt, Global Warming, and so on). . . .  I believe the present generation
ought to recognize and abide by its moral obligation to sustain valuable inherited resources—
natural and human-created—and perhaps even to improve upon them in order to create a
brighter future for generations to come (regardless of the risk of time portals).”); Daniel N.
Shaviro, Accrual Accounting and the Fiscal Gap, 41 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 209, 209 (2004) (“Cur-
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ture—and that we are failing to face up responsibly to those
obligations—prominently animates much current policy discussion.4
Appeals to our duty to future generations (often referred to
loosely as our children and grandchildren, but clearly encompassing
the collective future) are a staple of political rhetoric, seemingly no
matter the subject at hand.  In an appearance before voters in the
Midwest, for example, President Bush managed to invoke his listen-
ers’ progeny twice within a few paragraphs of the same speech: “I
want to tell you, yes, we can accomplish and win this fight in Iraq.
And . . . I want to tell you, we must, for the sake of our children and
our grandchildren.”5  Mr. Bush then added a minute later: “Failure in
Iraq would have serious consequences for the security of your chil-
dren and your grandchildren.”6
rent fiscal policy, unfortunately, has since 2001 . . . featur[ed] huge tax cuts, a potentially open-
ended new Medicare entitlement for prescription drugs, and costly foreign engagements as to
which no extra financing is even suggested.  Future generations will have to pay the bill for all
this.”); R. George Wright, The Interests of Posterity in the Constitutional Scheme, 59 U. CIN. L.
REV. 113, 141 (1990) (“[L]ow savings rates and imposed burdens of indebtedness are central to
the problem of the equal protection of future generations . . . .”).
4 Some economists are also in on the act. See, e.g., Laurence J. Kotlikoff, From Deficit
Delusion to Generational Accounting, HARV. BUS. REV., May/June 1993, at 104, 105 (“[The]
financial sacrifice [of today’s adults] will provide the means to keep tax rates on our children and
grandchildren from soaring.  It’s high time we started focusing on the size of the tax bill facing
our kids . . . .”).  Professor Kotlikoff has also written for a broader audience with a provocatively
titled book invoking the problems that he foresees arising between generations as the Baby
Boom generation begins to retire over the next few decades. See generally LAURENCE J. KOT-
LIKOFF & SCOTT BURNS, THE COMING GENERATIONAL STORM (2004).
5 President George W. Bush, Remarks at the Intercontinental Hotel Cleveland (July 10,
2007), available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/07/20070710-
6.html.
6 Id.  For a sample of other political references to the interests of future generations, see,
for example, Press Release, Senator Lindsey Graham, Graham Statement on Senator Kerry’s
Opposition to Personal Investment Accounts Becoming Part of Social Security (Sept. 8, 2004),
available at http://lgraham.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=PressRoom.PressReleases&
ContentRecord_id=0999F0C8-162E-4328-B4DA-259574BCDEF9 (“[Social Security] is too im-
portant for politics as usual.  Anyone wishing to lead our nation should offer proposals to
strengthen Social Security for future generations.  I hope Senators Kerry and John Edwards will
offer a constructive solution to this problem.  Without leadership the problems facing Social
Security will only get worse.”); Senator Barack Obama, A Hope to Fulfill (Apr. 26, 2005), availa-
ble at http://web.archive.org/web/20080110110834/http://obama.senate.gov/speech/050426-_a_
hope_to_fulfill/index.php (“Let me close by suggesting that Democrats are absolutely united in
the need to strengthen Social Security and make it solvent for future generations.  We know that,
and we want that.  And I believe that both Democrats and Republicans can work together to do
that.”); The White House: President George W. Bush, Strengthening Social Security, http://
georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/social-security/ (“President Bush has discussed
the importance of Social Security and the need to fix the Social Security system for future gener-
ations of Americans.”).
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Newspapers’ opinion pages also regularly carry messages of in-
tergenerational responsibility: “While philanthropy should be ap-
plauded, it can’t replace the basic responsibility we all have of saving
and investing in the future of the nation.”7  Sometimes, the message is
especially blunt: “We have no responsibility greater than as stewards
of our planet, and we’re blowing it.”8  The urge to hold ourselves re-
sponsible for the interests of future generations also extends to unex-
pected areas, such as the following inspirational statement from a
research center at The George Washington University Law School:
“The Institute for Constitutional Studies . . . is the nation’s premier
university-based institute dedicated to ensuring that future genera-
tions of Americans understand the substance and historical develop-
ment of the U.S. Constitution.”9
Although it would be impossible to determine who (among politi-
cians, pundits, academics, or others) invokes future generations most
frequently, or the area of policy (war, history, education, taxes, etc.) in
which the interests of future generations are presented most reflex-
ively as a crucial determinant of appropriate action, there is evidently
a widely-shared assumption that policy decisions must not be made
without taking into account the interests of generations yet to come.
Appeals to “mom and apple pie” are now more likely to be to “mom,
apple pie, and the grandkids.”10
It is possible, of course, that these and other invocations of the
interests of future generations are more cynical than aspirational.  Pol-
iticians, knowing that mentioning grandchildren is an expected staple
of stump speeches, might simply be paying lip service to the interests
of future generations while enacting policies that, deliberately or not,
are actually likely to impoverish and otherwise harm future human
beings.  Pundits, policy analysts, and scholars—even when motivated
by a genuine belief that their preferred policies are valuable on other
criteria—might be tempted simply to invoke the notion of intergener-
7 Anna Bernasek, The Rich Spend Just Like You and Me, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2006, § 3, at
11.
8 Nicholas D. Kristof, Op-Ed., Scandal Below the Surface, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2006, at
A25.
9 Institute for Constitutional Studies, The George Washington University Law School,
http://docs.law.gwu.edu/ics/ (last visited July 5, 2009).
10 The one-liner, “Why should I care about future generations when they haven’t done
anything for me?” might surface every now and then, but usually such a comment is used to
ridicule anyone who might oppose taking the interests of future generations into account, not as
an affirmative argument to favor the interests of the current generation.
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ational obligations as a safe rhetorical device rather than as a serious
statement of policy goals.11
For present purposes, however, the sincerity of those who invoke
the interests of future generations is less interesting than the virtual
unanimity of the belief that we are bad stewards of the future
(whether or not we are willing to do anything about it).  If people
agree on little else, seemingly everyone—no matter their level of so-
phistication, their position on the ideological spectrum, or their degree
of analytical integrity—appears to be unified in their willingness to
aver that we are cheating future generations and must do more for
them than we are currently doing.12
Even if some (though surely not all) of the people who speak
reverently of our obligations to promote the interests of future gener-
ations are less than sincere, it is important to ask what those interests
are, how we could take those interests into account if we were truly
motivated to do so, and how to balance those interests against our
own needs and desires.  In other words, if a person or policymaker
genuinely wished to be responsible to the interests of future genera-
tions, what would that entail?
The Focus of This Article
Notwithstanding the shared stated commitment to protecting the
interests of our progeny, the precise nature of current generations’
obligations to those who will follow has rarely been explored.  The
content of current generations’ obligations to future generations—
both in kind and in degree—turns out to be a matter of great uncer-
tainty.  Indeed, among those who have investigated these questions
deeply, the existence of any intergenerational obligations is not uni-
versally accepted; and even among those who agree that current gen-
erations should consider the needs of those who will follow, little else
is certain.  What we owe, how we can fulfill our debts, and what we
might reasonably weigh against the interests of future generations are
all profoundly interesting but also currently open questions.
11 Richard Schmalbeck suggests that invoking future generations might be an indirect way
of simply calling on people to be less selfish.  If, as seems to be the case in the United States,
calls to help “the poor and disadvantaged” have lost their ability to drive political discussion,
calls to help our children and grandchildren might partially bridge the gap between pure self-
interest and pure altruism.  Conversation with Richard L. Schmalbeck, Professor of Law, Duke
University School of Law (Aug. 8, 2007) (notes on file with author).
12 See supra notes 1–9 and accompanying text.
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This Article is intended to serve two purposes.  First, in Part II, I
frame a range of issues raised by questions of the intergenerational
impacts of current policy choices, starting with the fundamental ques-
tion of whether intergenerational obligations exist at all and proceed-
ing to a discussion of the choices that must be made to make the
analysis at least somewhat tractable.  As I discuss, the current litera-
ture on intergenerational justice is relatively well developed in the ar-
eas of philosophy and especially with respect to environmental policy
but relatively sparse in the areas of fiscal and economic policy.
As noted, however, even in the most fully developed literatures,
the discussion centers on the question of whether current generations
owe anything to future generations, leaving relatively unaddressed the
question of how much weight to apply to the putative desires of young
or unborn people.  Even on the threshold question, moreover, the
literature reaches no firm conclusions regarding the existence of in-
tergenerational moral obligations.  Perhaps the most surprising con-
clusion from this review, therefore, is that there is relatively little
beyond our basic intuitions to go on when determining whether there
are any obligations from current to future generations, and even less
to help us determine how much we might owe to future generations.
Second, this Article moves from the abstract philosophical discus-
sion in Part II to a discussion of a specific policy question in Part III,
focusing on a policy choice that profoundly implicates intergenera-
tional tradeoffs: government budget deficits.  This has the advantage
of allowing us to set aside, for the sake of getting started, several im-
portant variables that complicate the philosophical debate about in-
tergenerational justice—variables that can be reintroduced into the
analysis in future work.  For example, I limit the analysis by focusing
only on material living standards (with no environmental tradeoffs),
attempting to determine the interests of domestic citizens only rather
than all human beings, and setting aside questions such as optimal
population levels.  Even having confined the analysis in that way,
however, it turns out that balancing the interests of current and future
generations is surprisingly difficult and leads to unexpected
conclusions.
Specifically, I observe that, according to even very conservative
forecasts, the average living standards (as conventionally measured)
of future generations of Americans are likely to be much higher than
current living standards.  This raises the question of whether we are
already doing enough for future generations or, much more provoca-
tively, whether we are in fact doing too much for future generations
2009] What Do We Owe Future Generations? 1243
and should change our policies to benefit present generations more
than current policies do.
As a preliminary matter, I first address whether standard eco-
nomic analysis provides any guidance as to whether there are techni-
cal limits to what current generations could do to improve future
living standards.  The simple but counterintuitive answer is that it is
possible to do too much as well as too little even if we are completely
willing to be selfless on behalf of our grandchildren, which means that
it is possible for current generations to engage in self-sacrifice that
ultimately does nothing to benefit future generations.
Within the range where current generations would be able to in-
crease the happiness of their heirs at the cost of some of their own
happiness, the issue then becomes a matter of balance.  I briefly dis-
cuss how two prominent philosophical approaches—utilitarianism and
Rawlsianism—might be applied to determine how to balance the in-
terests of different people in the intergenerational context.  I tenta-
tively conclude that utilitarian analysis argues for more present-
oriented policies, while Rawlsianism is at most silent on the issue.
The suggestion that we might want to do more for ourselves and
less on behalf of generations to come is, to this author and no doubt to
many readers, not only surprising but viscerally unsettling as well.
Therefore, Part III concludes with an exploration of two reasons why
current generations might well engage in policies that have the effect
of enhancing the interests of future generations, even though the poli-
cies could be motivated by the purely selfish interests of currently-
living generations.  As I show, considerations of financial and political
stability can induce us to adopt policies that will benefit our children
and grandchildren even as the policies benefit us as well.  Because of
these situations where there is no tradeoff between our interests and
those of our grandchildren, we might not need to make decisions that
make us worse off now.
The matter of distributive justice—of how to balance the interests
of the rich, the poor, and those in the middle—is the analytical focus
of Part IV.  Given the lack of precise guidance as to how to make
fiscal policy choices (and, for that matter, to make other choices in
public policy) that require intergenerational balancing, there are help-
ful formulations drawn from notions of distributive justice that offer
insights into how to turn core moral precepts into guidelines for poli-
cies that are equitable both within and across generations.  Treating
questions of intergenerational justice in the same way that we treat
questions of intragenerational justice (e.g., committing to a more egal-
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itarian distribution of incomes) is potentially more promising than at-
tempting to treat intergenerational justice as a separate moral inquiry.
This is thus an example of an interesting and important question
that is potentially worth examining even if it turns out that there is
ultimately no fully satisfying answer.  Opening up the range of pos-
sibilities beyond what we thought they were (for example, asking
whether it might not be morally reprehensible to save somewhat less
for the benefit of future generations) might itself be noteworthy.
Even if we ultimately decide that we would nevertheless feel uncom-
fortable adopting policies that weigh the interests of current genera-
tions more heavily than those of future generations, it is important to
confront directly the motivations and consequences of our choices.
Moreover, adding an explicit inquiry into how distributional issues af-
fect the analysis offers the promise of significantly improving our pol-
icy choices.
As noted and as I discuss below, this Article only briefly touches
upon environmental and other issues that have traditionally been
thought to be outside the realm of macroeconomic policy.  Instead, as
an analytical choice (and definitely not as a matter of personal priori-
ties), I focus almost exclusively upon core questions of fiscal policy as
it affects current and future generations.  In a follow-up article, I will
engage with the environmental aspects of intergenerational justice
and integrate those issues into the fiscal policy questions discussed
here, thus adding a dimension to the analytical space and confronting
directly the critically important environment-versus-economic-growth
tradeoffs that I do not address here.  Additional future articles in this
area of inquiry will discuss cross-national comparisons of social atti-
tudes toward intergenerational obligations, religious implications of
intergenerational justice, and other questions.  For current purposes,
however, the single dimension of fiscal policy raises sufficiently diffi-
cult questions and yields provocative and promising insights.
II. Framing the Issues: The Philosophy of Intergenerational Justice
The potential scope of an analysis of intergenerational justice is
seemingly limitless.  Intergenerational justice is more than a policy
goal or even a philosophical puzzle.  It is a universal issue, a lens
through which to view every question, a concern that arises inevitably
from virtually every act of commission or omission.  The potential
scope is so broad, in fact, that it takes almost as much effort to deter-
mine how to limit and organize the analysis as it does actually to carry
out the ultimate inquiry.
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For example, in the Fall semester of 2006, I taught a seminar ti-
tled “What Do We Owe Future Generations?” at New York Univer-
sity School of Law.  Although my interests in the subject were firmly
grounded in the fiscal policy issues that had motivated most of my
scholarly agenda to date (as both an economist and a legal scholar), I
allowed the students in the seminar to expand our scope beyond fiscal
policy and into other areas of intergenerational justice.  In response to
a questionnaire about the subjects that we might cover during the
term, the students offered some suggestions that were easy to antici-
pate—that we owe future generations a vibrant economy, a good edu-
cation, good health and medical care, a sound physical environment—
as well as others that were quite surprising, including questions about
reproductive rights, the obligations to provide political stability and to
guarantee the physical safety and integrity of citizens, even the obliga-
tion to preserve citizens’ access to human history (such as the protec-
tion of antiquities from plundering).13
In other words, the students quickly determined that we poten-
tially have obligations to future generations in every area of public
policy (and, for that matter, in every area of the law school curricu-
lum): criminal law, environmental law, family law, international law,
property law (such as the Rule Against Perpetuities), and so on with-
out apparent limit.  Indeed, just when it appeared that constitutional
law might be the only area of the standard law school curriculum that
was not on the list of potential subjects, one student proposed (and is
in the process of writing) a research paper that looks at our negative
obligations to future generations, specifically the obligation not to tie
the hands of future generations such that it is unduly difficult for them
to undo any of our decisions that they might want to change.14  For
example, the United States Constitution and a number of non-consti-
tutional legal arrangements create supermajority requirements to
make it difficult to reverse the policy decisions made by previous
(sometimes long-dead) decisionmakers.  Some of those decisions,
even if made in the good faith belief that they would surely help fu-
ture generations, will turn out to have been bad decisions.
The future value of policy flexibility thus creates a paradox.  We
might want to do well by future generations, but the things that we
choose when trying to determine what we owe future generations
13 The list of topics—a five-page, single-spaced document summarizing the suggestions of
the students—is on file with the author.
14 Tricia Bushnell, The Politics of Supermajorities: The Effects of Today’s Decisions on
Tomorrow’s Citizens (May 28, 2007) (unpublished research paper, on file with author).
1246 The George Washington Law Review [Vol. 77:1237
might not only be wrong but also needlessly difficult to undo.  A fu-
ture generation that finds automobiles an unacceptable way to travel
will not appreciate the huge sacrifices that we are currently making to
remove natural habitat and replace it with large networks of highways.
Even decisions that are not so difficult to reverse in a physical sense,
though, can unnecessarily tie the hands of future people.
Even short of the amendment process, moreover, commitments
to constitutional principles themselves can be viewed as fundamental
commitments to future generations.  For example, one politically lib-
eral commentator recently argued that
it’s an insult to the Constitution, if you think that high crimes
and misdemeanors have been committed, to not keep im-
peachment [of President Bush] on the table as the remedy to
those things.  If you don’t, you’re setting an evil precedent
for future generations and future . . . presidents that it is OK
to get away with those things.  I think we owe it to our kids
and our grandkids . . . to not take impeachment off the
table.15
A colleague offered a further thought that demonstrated the
breadth of the issues potentially raised under the banner of in-
tergenerational justice.  Do we, he asked, owe future generations the
opportunity to overcome adversity?16  How can there be a next Great-
est Generation if future generations are given everything by their dot-
ing grandparents?17  He thus posed a generation-wide version of the
question that is raised by so-called “trust fund babies,” that is,
whether it is possible to be too generous to one’s offspring.  From this
perspective, questions about current generations’ obligations to future
generations become even more complicated.  No longer are we
“merely” trying to find a balance between what we are willing to give
up and the welfare of our children, grandchildren, and generations
beyond.  Now we must also include the possibility that our sacrifices
will not only hurt us but hurt our offspring as well.
15 Countdown with Keith Olbermann (MSNBC television broadcast Jan. 23, 2008) (com-
ments of Rachel Maddow), transcript available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/22823687/.
16 See James E. McNair et al., Family Incentive Trusts: Dynamic New Approach Employing
Trust Distributions to Communicate Family Values and to Promote Productivity and Performance
in Beneficiaries, WEALTH STRATEGIES J., May/June 2007, http://www.wealthstrategiesjournal.
com/articles/2008/09/family-incentive-trusts-dynami.html.
17 Id. (“It is a situation that many parents and grandparents, particularly those with signifi-
cant wealth, dread: the trust fund baby. . . .  For some children of wealth and privilege, and the
parents who raise them, . . . a crisis of motivation can be very real . . . .”).
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In short, there is a seemingly limitless range of possible questions
and policy issues implicated by an analysis of whether there are obli-
gations between generations.  Two approaches to addressing the no-
tion of intergenerational justice might each be fruitful: examining
scholarly inquiries about the general nature of intergenerational obli-
gations, and narrowing the analysis to one hopefully more tractable
question which can then serve as a starting point from which we might
later expand the analysis to encompass further policy issues.  I pursue
the former approach in the remainder of this Part and the latter ap-
proach in the Part that follows.
A. Scholarly Literature on Intergenerational Justice: Conclusions
and Limitations
Intergenerational equity and justice are core concerns that can
dramatically transform one’s analysis of virtually every area of law
and public policy.  Concern about our impact on future generations is
not a separate area of inquiry but a key component that is at least
lurking in the background of virtually every policy question.  As such,
“the issue of how to treat events occurring long into the future has
long attracted significant attention from lawyers, philosophers, econo-
mists, and environmental activists.”18
Although it is reasonable to describe this scholarly attention as
“significant,” the attention has not been extensive or sustained in the
legal literature.  A recent symposium published in The Loyola of Los
Angeles Law Review produced a number of good papers discussing
broad issues of intergenerational justice,19 and another recent sympo-
sium issue of The University of Chicago Law Review focused on the
question of discounting as it informs the debate over intergenerational
equity.20  (As several of the authors whose pieces appear in that sym-
posium note, though, the discount rate analysis can so dominate many
analyses of intergenerational equity that “[t]he major question comes
down to the choice of discount rate, how we compare cash flows oc-
curring at different time periods.”21)  There is certainly a body of liter-
18 David A. Weisbach & Cass R. Sunstein, Symposium on Intergenerational Equity and
Discounting, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 2 (2007).
19 See Coleman Bazelon & Kent Smetters, Discounting in the Long Term, 35 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 277 (2001); Axel P. Gosseries, What Do We Owe the Next Generation(s)?, 35 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 293 (2001); Theodore P. Seto, Intergenerational Decision Making: An Evolutionary Per-
spective, 35 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 235 (2001); Lawrence B. Solum, To Our Children’s Children’s
Children: The Problems of Intergenerational Ethics, 35 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 163 (2001).
20 Symposium, Intergenerational Equity and Discounting, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (2007).
21 Weisbach & Sunstein, supra note 18, at 1–3.
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ature out there (much of which is cited in the various symposium
pieces), but its conclusions are tentative in general, and it is to a large
degree not immediately helpful in answering the limited question of
fiscal intergenerational equity that is central to the analysis in Part III
below.
The pure theory of intergenerational justice was most signifi-
cantly advanced by the appearance of Derek Parfit’s Reasons and Per-
sons22 twenty-five years ago.  In 2006, the philosopher Tim Mulgan
provided an admirable summary and extension of many of the ideas
advanced by Parfit and others.23  By far the largest body of scholarly
work that discusses or implicates intergenerational issues—in the phil-
osophical, legal, and economic literatures—concerns itself with envi-
ronmental issues.24  Indeed, The University of Chicago Law Review
symposium noted above includes significant contributions on ques-
tions such as global warming and other crucial environmental issues.25
On the specific question raised in this Article about whether it is
correct to presume that current generations should not make future
generations worse off, the relevant literatures contain only hints that
such a presumption is worth examining.  The economist Robert Eisner
remarked occasionally in books and in opinion articles on the precise
point raised above, i.e., that future generations in the United States
seem to be in for a particularly good intergenerational windfall, mak-
ing calls for near-term sacrifice—especially by the elderly—difficult to
understand or justify.26
In the legal literature, there has been a passing exchange on these
issues between Daniel Shaviro and me over the past few years.  I did
22 DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS (1984).
23 See TIM MULGAN, FUTURE PEOPLE (2006).
24 For an illustration of this point, see the extensive bibliography provided in AVNER DE-
SHALIT, WHY POSTERITY MATTERS: ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND FUTURE GENERATIONS
144–55 (1995).
25 See, e.g., Douglas A. Kysar, Discounting . . . on Stilts, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 119 (2007).
26 Although I did not recall a specific quotation by Eisner when I first raised this issue
several years ago (and therefore thought myself unique in raising it), I have no doubt that I must
have absorbed the point in my extensive reading of Eisner’s work, which often addressed in-
tergenerational issues. See, e.g., Robert Eisner, Must We Save for Our Grandchildren?, WALL
ST. J., June 3, 1998, at A18 (“[Future generations] will almost certainly be consuming much more
than their parents and grandparents anyway . . . .  In 34 years, when the Social Security system is
expected to be in the red, income per worker would have increased by 40% from today’s level.
Even allowing for a drain of some 11% to support the increased proportion of retirees, there
would still be enough income and output for everybody then alive to consume 25% more than
today.  In this light, the case for sacrifice now is not compelling.”); see also ROBERT EISNER, THE
MISUNDERSTOOD ECONOMY 121–44 (1994) (rebutting criticisms that Social Security spending is
creating intergenerational harms).
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little more than raise the basic question of intergenerational fiscal ob-
ligation in a draft article that I presented at Professor Shaviro’s tax
policy colloquium in early 2004.27  Apparently in response to my hav-
ing called attention to the issue, Shaviro then sketched out some pre-
liminary thoughts in a small section of an article in late 2004 critiquing
George W. Bush’s fiscal policies.28  I responded equally briefly when
re-drafting my symposium piece and publishing it in 2005.29  Finally, I
simply raised the issue again as a caveat in my recent article on public
investment, highlighting my intention finally to engage with the issue
here.30  The direct issues raised in this Article, therefore, have not
been entirely absent from the literature;31 but the discussion has been
preliminary and has not been applied to specific fiscal policy
questions.32
The literature on intergenerational justice is, therefore, reasona-
bly well developed in some areas and has recently benefited signifi-
cantly from the symposia noted above.  Even so, the big issues remain
surprisingly open, and perhaps the best approach, as I describe below,
is to attempt to extend to an intergenerational framework certain ap-
proaches derived from the literature on distributive justice.
Do Generations Exist?
Having reached this point, it is necessary to acknowledge that, as
a literal matter, generations do not exist in any analytically rigorous
(that is, nonarbitrary) sense.  Even people who were born at exactly
the same moment have no reason to believe (even if they are aware of
each other and of the coincidence of their moment of birth) that they
will die at the same time.  The use of the term “generation” thus nec-
essarily implies a clean demarcation that does not exist.
27 See Neil H. Buchanan, What Is Fiscal Responsibility? Long-Term Deficits, Generational
Accounting, and Capital Budgeting, 38–43 (Rutgers U. (Newark) Legal Working Paper Series,
Paper No. 8, 2004), available at http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/fp/art8.  The article
was presented at the New York University School of Law’s Tax Policy and Public Finance Collo-
quium, April 20, 2004.
28 See Daniel N. Shaviro, Reckless Disregard: The Bush Administration’s Policy of Cutting
Taxes in the Face of an Enormous Fiscal Gap, 45 B.C. L. REV. 1285, 1331–33 (2004).
29 Buchanan, Long-Term Deficits, supra note 3, at 284–85, 323–24.
30 Buchanan, Good Deficits, supra note 3, at 350–52.
31 See, e.g., supra note 3 (referencing the contributions of R. George Wright and Brett M.
Frischmann); supra notes 19–20 and accompanying text (discussing recent symposia on issues of
intergenerational justice).
32 I discuss below the brief arguments that Shaviro offered in his 2004 piece. See infra
notes 117–22 and accompanying text.
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In addition, Parfit discusses the concept of “psychological con-
tinuity” and the philosophical argument that a person at one point in
time might not be the same person that she was at a different time.33
The idea is that even individuals whom we commonly assume to be
the same people might in fact be different people at different times,
making it even more problematic to discuss people as being meaning-
fully categorized by their dates of birth.
Notwithstanding these profound questions of identity and con-
tinuity, it is of course common to refer imprecisely to generations such
as Baby Boomers, the World War II generation, Generations X, Y,
and Z, and so on.  In the “generational accounting” literature that I
have criticized at length,34 the authors adopt the convention of treat-
ing people in decade-long birth-year cohorts as separate generations,
comparing the lifetime net tax rates of people born in different de-
cades of the twentieth century.35
Therefore, this Article follows the common, admittedly imprecise
practice of referring to generations as groups of people who are born
within some limited number of years of one another.  In most cases,
the discussion here need not turn on fine questions of how many years
should be included within a specific generation because the discussion
generally differentiates—at most—four roughly discrete groups of
people: today’s adults, today’s children, people not yet born but who
will be born before those living today have died, and those people
who will be born after everyone living today has passed on.
B. Are There Any Intergenerational Obligations?
As noted above, the most surprising fact about the existing litera-
ture on intergenerational justice is that there is not universal agree-
ment that current generations owe anything at all to future
generations.36  Moreover, the analyses that have been offered to jus-
tify an affirmative answer to the question of intergenerational obliga-
33 See PARFIT, supra note 22, at 219–23.  This theory is, admittedly, not widely accepted
among philosophers today.  Whether one accepts this theory or not, the larger point is that it is
analytically messy to impute meaningful characteristics to a person based on her birth cohort.
34 Buchanan, Long-Term Deficits, supra note 3, at 310–15.
35 See Alan J. Auerbach, Jagadeesh Gokhale & Laurence J. Kotlikoff, Generational Ac-
counting: A Meaningful Way to Evaluate Fiscal Policy, 8 J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 1994, at 73,
73–75.
36 An excellent, indeed perhaps definitive, summary of the philosophical literature on in-
tergenerational justice can be found in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. See Lukas
Meyer, Intergenerational Justice, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, http://
plato.stanford.edu/entries/justice-intergenerational/.
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tion are often tentative.  I will briefly describe some of these
arguments below, but it would be unwise to make too much of the
theoretically open question of whether any obligations exist between
generations.  Summarizing the views of participants in the conference
that led to their symposium issue on intergenerational equity and dis-
counting, Weisbach and Sunstein concluded: “Most analysts (and we
believe all of the essays in the conference) take the position that fu-
ture generations should count, and most likely count equally to those
currently alive.”37  Thus, however tentatively (and not unanimously),
an apparent majority of those who have addressed the question have
affirmed what is probably a widely-held intuition that future genera-
tions matter.
To motivate the inquiry, it is perhaps worthwhile to begin by pos-
ing a provocative question.  If we were to make policy choices that
resulted in members of some future generation experiencing the same
standard of living that the typical American experienced in, say, 1950,
we might at least wonder how a member of that future generation
could plausibly complain.  They will not do anything to deserve the
stock of capital (knowledge, technology, machines, structures of gov-
ernance, etc.) that we will give to them, capital that is necessary to
produce a rather high—by any reasonable historical measure—stan-
dard of living (just as we did not do anything to deserve what we re-
ceived from our forebears).  Moreover, there will be billions of people
in poorer parts of the world who, for decades hence (and sadly, per-
haps forever) will never even come close to the living standard that
Americans enjoyed over a half century ago.  Furthermore, billions of
people living today and virtually everyone who lived prior to the In-
dustrial Revolution received little from previous generations, making
their way through life on the basis of whatever they could eke out.38
In that sense, giving future generations anything at all might be a mat-
ter of grace.
Even putting such an argument to paper, however, feels uncom-
fortable.  Most of the people who lived and died centuries ago en-
37 Weisbach & Sunstein, supra note 18, at 1.
38 This is, of course, an overstatement.  The accumulation of human knowledge over the
millennia was substantial.  As a comparative matter, however, the advances in material living
standards from the beginning of the industrial revolution to date (in the parts of the world where
it has had its most significant effects) make that which came before pale by comparison in many
ways. See Robert M. Solow, Survival of the Richest?, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Nov. 22, 2007, at 38,
38.  Even though mankind had invented language, mathematics, early medicine, astronomy, etc.,
and had made major advances in public health, the vast majority of people still “lived in hovels
and wore rags” at the beginning of the Industrial Revolution. See id.
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dured a miserable existence not because someone chose to make them
live more miserably than necessary but because misery was a nearly
universal human condition.39  Having the choice to make someone
better off, yet choosing not to exercise that choice, is very different
from what transpired many generations ago.
The comparison to currently living people in the poorest parts of
the world, though, becomes even more uncomfortable in this light.
Here, we actually have made (mostly implicit) choices that deem the
vast majority of the human race undeserving of intragenerational ac-
tion to remediate their misery.  If we are willing to make such choices
about people whose suffering we occasionally actually see, what might
cause us to think twice about people who either do not exist or whose
connection to us is only greater than others due to accidents of geog-
raphy and genetics?
Perhaps, however, this is both too harsh and also the wrong ques-
tion.  Even if people are myopic, or poorly informed, or simply believe
that they actually can do nothing to help people in other parts of the
world, that is not a reason to forbid a person from wanting to take into
account the well-being of future generations.  We need not, after all,
insist on consistency in people’s generosity.  If people do want to care
about some people and not others, it is still helpful to determine the
basis of such a choice.
In asking whether future generations deserve anything, it is useful
to ask first why they might not deserve our consideration.  Although it
is undeniably absurd to argue that future generations have never done
anything “for us,” it is simply a fact that future generations cannot yet
have done anything to deserve anything.  If desert is based on reward
for actions taken, future generations are out of the game before it
begins.  If we decide that future generations deserve something that
would justify changing what we would otherwise do, then it must be
because of something inherent to the very nature of being in a future
generation or because of something that we believe they can or will do
after they are alive and able to act.
One basis for intergenerational obligations is Kant’s “categorical
imperative,”40 or in layman’s terms, the what-if-everyone-did-this
39 See id. at 38–39 (describing the “grim” pre-Industrial Revolution conditions from
1200–1800; throughout the period, the average individual saw almost no growth in living stan-
dards and survived on subsistence wages).
40 See IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 48–54 (Mary Gregor trans., Cam-
bridge Univ. Press 1991) (“The categorical imperative . . . is: Act upon a maxim that can also
hold as a universal law.”).
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question.  If the generation before the current one had decided as a
group that it did not care about future generations, and if some level
of care is necessary for the next generation to exist (for example, the
basic care that parents give to children), then the current generation
would not exist.  Given that we want to exist, we should ensure the
existence of future generations who will also be glad that they were
allowed to exist.  To a certain degree, of course, this argument as-
sumes its result by imagining that people will feel a sufficient connec-
tion with other people that they will want to make those other people
happy.  Even if that merely relocates the desire to be intergeneration-
ally just, however, it at least arguably relocates the desire to what ap-
pears to be a more primal level.  Instead of asking whether people
care about other people’s standard of living, this argument only asks
whether they are willing to share the notion of life itself.
A minor variation on this argument suggests that people do not
care about future generations in general but only about their children.
(Caring about other generations that they might actually know before
they die supports this argument as well, but it is sufficient for parents
simply to care about their children.)  People who have had children
must have done so because they wanted to be parents (with obvious
exceptions), so if they want their children to be happy, they will want
their children to experience the happiness of parenting.  This makes
the original parents care about their grandchildren indirectly, and this
so-called generational linking thus makes each parent care about the
prospects of every generation to come.
This story can also be told in an evolutionary framework, in
which each organism evolves only by developing ways for its genes to
be passed on, which occurs through the survival of its offspring.  Like
most such explanations, this one is essentially tautological because, of
course, organisms that do not develop in ways to pass on their genes
cease to exist.41  Still, it is not difficult to imagine that the desire to
create and care for future generations is somehow built into our DNA.
The Problem of Non-Specific Future People
If the explanations above do not satisfactorily justify an obliga-
tion to future generations, especially beyond those members of future
41 The other disquieting aspect of evolutionary explanations is how similar they are to
casual nonexplanations of people’s supposedly fundamental nature. See, e.g., Verlyn
Klinkenborg, Trying Times Ahead: The Prospect of 60 Million Californians, N.Y. TIMES, July 18,
2007, at A18 (“We can’t help believing in growth.  We can’t help believing that the way to create
change is simply to buy different stuff, so growth doesn’t stop.”).
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generations who have already been born (and are thus knowable be-
ings), we need to inquire more carefully into the distinction between
the living and the not-yet-living.  How might currently living genera-
tions treat their younger members differently from the non-specific
future people who might or might not come into existence?
A provocative and compelling response to this question was de-
scribed by Parfit in his discussion of the “person affecting principle,”
which starts from the fundamental ethical requirement that humans
have an obligation not to affirmatively harm an actual person.42  This
does not, of course, provide a useful baseline for determining what
level of care—that is, what constitutes “harm”—is owed to actual peo-
ple (perhaps of younger generations), but once a baseline is chosen,
people have a duty to respect that baseline and not harm any actual
person’s legitimate interests.  This is thus a rather simple way to gen-
eralize obligations toward younger living people beyond familial con-
nections—though, again, this leaves open the question of baselines.
After everyone currently alive has died, however, the content of
future generations will be determined by the combination of factors
that determine the path of human existence.  That is, every choice and
non-choice brings into existence one possible universe while destroy-
ing other possible universes.  Each choice determines, in one way or
another through path dependence (or what is in essence the familiar
butterfly effect), which of an infinite number of potential future
human beings will actually come into existence.43
Therefore, even the mundane fiscal policy choices that we make
today will contribute toward the determination of who is born and
who never comes into being.  An increase in government spending
might create jobs where there would not otherwise have been jobs,
causing two people to meet at their new jobs and to fall in love, and
causing their child to exist in part because of the fiscal policy choice
that was made before it was born.
If that child’s economic reality turns out to be quite unhappy, he
might well rue the fiscal choices that created jobs decades before but
bankrupted him years later.  If he were to ask: “How could you do this
to me?,” the honest answer is that if we had not made the fiscal
choices that we made, he would never have existed at all.  Thus, even
if future people are miserable, they as individuals might not have a
basis on which to complain—unless, of course, they would prefer
42 See PARFIT, supra note 22, at 393–94.  Although Parfit discusses the person-affecting
principle, his contribution is to defend impersonal or non-person-affecting principles.
43 See id. at 351–55.
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never to have existed rather than to be living the miserable lives to
which our choices doom them.
Taken seriously, this idea would excuse current generations from
taking into consideration any effects of their decisions on non-living
future generations.  Even if there were some relatively short-term in-
tergenerational obligations, a person who could confidently believe
that they could enact selfish policies but put off the day of reckoning
long enough could fulfill only those intergenerational obligations that
accrue to living children and grandchildren.  The essential question is
whether it is possible to overcome this uncomfortable conclusion on
philosophical grounds that do not rely upon direct familial
connections.
One possible answer is simply to assert that there is a chain of
humanity to which we owe an obligation of care.  If we believe that all
people are deserving of respect and will be born with dignity, then we
should respect that dignity by not making decisions that will surely
result in their misery.  Thus, we can view our obligation not to harm
people as an obligation toward any person who might come into exis-
tence in the future.
Taking this obligation seriously would require us to embrace the
knowledge that our actions will inevitably bring some people into ex-
istence while foreclosing the possibility that others will ever be born.
This means that our choices have consequences, and we have an obli-
gation (even under a non-person-affecting principle) to avoid causing
misery when we can do so.  Given that some of our choices could
bring into existence people living non-miserable lives, we have the re-
sponsibility to make the choices that bring the people into existence
who will be relatively happy and not others who are fated to misery.
We would thus owe it to potential future generations to make deci-
sions that do not bring into existence those individuals who would be
least happy during their time on Earth.  Even if one were to believe
that existence itself is priceless, it is simply true that we can only bring
a finite number out of an infinite range of possible people into exis-
tence.  We are then obligated (assuming that non-person-affecting
principles are valid) to make the harm-minimizing choice.
Given the imperfection of our knowledge about how our deci-
sions will affect future people, this is of course only a rough guide as
to how to make choices, especially fiscal policy choices.  Even so, this
reasoning provides a way around the “person affecting principle” that
is distinct from the argument that we owe future generations some-
thing because they are part of the continuing chain of humanity.  It
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more directly imposes on us a duty to recognize when our decisions
might cause misery and to reject those choices.
There is thus a wide variety of philosophical answers to the broad
question of whether current generations owe anything at all to future
generations.  As noted above, it is possible to find all of the arguments
lacking and to remain unconvinced that such obligations exist.  I join
the majority in concluding, at least tentatively, that we do owe a duty
to future generations, which immediately raises the essential question
of how to implement that obligation.
C. How Much Do We Owe?
Given the lively and interesting theorizing about the existence of
an obligation to consider future generations, it is rather surprising and
even disappointing that the literature is relatively silent on the ques-
tion of how to balance future interests against current interests.  Some
philosophers acknowledge that the question is fundamental but also
simply acknowledge that there is little or nothing more that is cur-
rently available to support a particular theory of how to balance cur-
rent and future generations’ respective interests.44
Reviewing the arguments summarized above regarding the possi-
ble philosophical foundation of intergenerational obligations, none of
the arguments lends itself to anything more than the conclusion that
an obligation exists.  For example, even if one believes in the chain of
humanity, that notion provides nothing that would guide policy
choices that require intergenerational tradeoffs.  Once we have deter-
mined that a policy choice pits one group of humans against another,
the obligations run in both directions.  Some current decisions, after
all, that might make some future generations worse off could reduce
deep misery in some parts of the world today.  We have an obligation
not to inflict misery on ourselves or others, but beyond those polar
extremes, there is no apparent guidance on how to create a balance of
miseries.
There is also the possibility that our obligations to future genera-
tions would require not merely balancing present versus future inter-
ests but choosing which types of interests we are willing to balance.
Current generations might, for example, acknowledge moral and cul-
tural connections to future generations and feel that they are part of
the chain of humanity but may nevertheless choose not to share their
44 For an example of how to fill the void from a communitarian perspective, see DE-SHA-
LIT, supra note 24, at 15–16, 139 n.6.
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property or economic assets with future generations.  In other words,
an admission by current generations that we have an obligation to fu-
ture generations does not even foreclose the possibility that we might
decide to pass forward some aspects of the human condition while
also deciding that, when it comes to their material existence, future
generations are on their own.
The broad question of balancing generational interests is there-
fore still open as a theoretical matter.  As I discuss below, scholars
who ask how to balance generational interests must generally start
from the assumption that such balancing is desirable and then explore
how to determine the best way to choose among policy options.  As
noted earlier, one approach is to view the balancing process as a mat-
ter of choosing the discount rate,45 where choosing a higher discount
rate has the effect of putting less weight on the interests of genera-
tions further out into the future. That approach is not without its crit-
ics, however.  Douglas Kysar, for example, objects that the use of a
discount rate undervalues “vital questions of intergenerational equity”
and therefore “has the practical effect of dramatically diminishing the
apparent significance of policy effects on future generations.”46
The discounting approach, therefore, leaves many questions un-
answered.  The most promising approach, as I discuss in Part IV, is to
treat intergenerational choices the same way that we treat questions
of inequality within generations, which means that we should apply
familiar theories of distributive justice to unfamiliar questions.  Al-
though our existing theories of intragenerational distributive justice
are themselves well known to leave open many questions and thus to
relegate final decisions to be determined in the political process, ap-
plying a familiar set of arguments as we grapple with intergenerational
questions offers the promise of at least some progress toward a sensi-
ble political outcome.
The “Better Than Me” Standard
Before proceeding, it will be worthwhile to discuss one common
response to the question of what we owe to future generations.  Hav-
ing spoken with a large number of colleagues about this subject, and
having presented these ideas at a number of workshops, it is remarka-
ble how common is the almost pre-cognitive response from listeners
that “I just want my kids to do better than me.”  This desire has even
45 See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
46 Kysar, supra note 25, at 119.
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been described as being a fundamental part of “the American
dream.”47  As discussed above regarding intergenerational linking, this
basic desire to help one’s children can be used as a building block to
justify obligations across multiple generations; but even if the logic of
intergenerational concern breaks down before infinity, we should take
seriously the idea that people want their children to “do better” than
they have.  The ubiquity of the “better than me” response48 thus de-
serves reflection.
There are several problems with the “better than me” standard.
First, it does not even attempt to answer the question of why one’s
own situation is the best baseline from which to measure one’s chil-
dren’s prospects.  Why are we not concerned with having our children
do better than the children of the proverbial Joneses?  Even taking
this standard seriously, moreover, leaves open further baseline issues.
For example, must children be better off than their parents were when
the parents were young, or better off than their parents are later in
life?  Most importantly, how much better off must our children be in
order to satisfy this standard?  Twice as well off?  Ten percent better
off?  One-tenth of one percent better off?
No matter the baseline, the visceral response is ultimately either
nonresponsive or at least creates only the most basic requirement of
not moving backward in some sense.  That alone is potentially useful,
though, because there might be situations where the possibility of
moving backward becomes quite real, especially if increases in aver-
age gross domestic product (“GDP”) per capita are (as discussed be-
low) masking a lack of progress for large groups of people.  Despite its
shortcomings, moreover, it is possible to marry the concern that ani-
mates the “better than me” standard with distributional concerns to
make an argument that, at least over time, inequality must decline.  I
further discuss this possibility in Part IV.C below.
47 Bob Herbert, Op-Ed., Anxious About Tomorrow, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2007, at A15
(quoting Andrew Stern, President, Service Employees International Union, who argues that
“[w]orkers are incredibly, legitimately scared that the American dream, particularly the belief
that their kids will do better, is ending”).
48 See, e.g., Bob Herbert, The Fading Dream, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2006, at A25 (“For
perhaps the first time in history, there is a large swath of Americans who are worried that over
the long haul their children will not fare as well as they have.”).  Note that, in Herbert’s formula-
tion, the aspiration has been downgraded from “better than” to “as well as.” See supra text
accompanying note 47.
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D. Who Are the Future Generations?
A further complication regarding policy analysis concerns what is
meant by asking both what “we” owe future generations and who or
what might qualify for membership in a future generation whose well-
being we are trying to balance against our own.  In the discussion be-
low, I have chosen to ask what we as currently living adult American
citizens should take into account when formulating U.S. fiscal policies,
most particularly when thinking about broad aspects of fiscal policy
like aggregate budget deficits, public and private investment, etc.
This is hardly the only possible choice, however, even if it is a
necessary starting point for present purposes.  It would certainly be
possible, for example, to think in global terms about what all of the
countries in the world (or perhaps the much smaller numbers of coun-
tries that are home to the vast majority of market production in the
world) should do in the aggregate in determining their spending and
taxing.  Just as it is analytically difficult to defend the tendency in the
United States to treat our fiscal policies as if only the federal govern-
ment made fiscal decisions (thus ignoring states and localities),49 it is
also simply wrong to imagine that nations’ fiscal policies are indepen-
dent of each other.  Certainly, many analysts are acutely aware of the
links between the United States federal government and its creditors
(most prominently in recent years, China), making it important to
think about the global economy rather than national economies.
Who might be included in the future generations about whom we
are concerned?  Even limiting the focus to future Americans is not
enough to assume away the analytical difficulties because the possibil-
ity of immigration and emigration means that future Americans are
not simply the offspring of current Americans.  This further opens up
difficult questions of citizenship and other issues of inclusion and
exclusion.
Because one of the points that I make in the final Section of the
paper is that questions of intergenerational justice cannot be removed
from the political arena, we would do well to remember that the polit-
ical debates about future generations can be fundamentally altered by
identifying the potential beneficiaries of current sacrifice.  Sacrificing
for “our children and grandchildren” is one thing, but voters might
well make very different decisions when considering whether to help
49 See Buchanan, Long-Term Deficits, note 3, at 291–92.
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other people’s progeny.  One simple way to observe this is to note the
extreme unpopularity of foreign aid among American voters.50
E. How Far into the Future?
As noted above, one of the key distinctions in the philosophical
literature is between future generations of people who are currently
alive versus those who are yet to be born.  The obligations to those
already in existence (but too young to participate in the governance
decisions that will, in part, determine their future prospects) might
well be greater than are our obligations to those who are yet to be
born.  It turns out, however, that this distinction is not an important
factor in confronting most of the specific policy issues below.  Know-
ing that there is a transition stage during which some of us who are
currently living will continue to live while new beings come into exis-
tence allows us, for policy purposes, to smooth over the analytical dis-
tinction raised by not-yet-born future generations.
A somewhat more important concern arises when considering the
limits of human existence.  Even short of the possibility of man-made
nuclear, biological, or chemical catastrophe, life on Earth might not
last more than another one thousand years or so, simply because of
changes in weather patterns or naturally-occurring diseases that could
destroy all life on the planet over the span of several centuries.  Al-
though that might well be far enough into the future to blur into most
peoples’ concept of “forever,” it is interesting to consider what would
happen if we knew for sure that human life would end on a specific
date that is relatively soon, for example, in one hundred years.
One version of this possibility is depicted in the recent film Chil-
dren of Men, in which a virus makes all human women infertile.51
People thus know that there will be no future generations at all.  Al-
though that particular film (and the book on which it is based52) posit
that people would respond to such a world by spiraling into despair
and violence, it is also possible that it would give people less reason to
fight and die for land or riches if they knew that there was no reason
to accumulate riches other than the immediate gratification available
in this life.
This fantasy scenario is worth discussing here because it brings
into focus the similarity between our current situation, in which we
50 See, e.g., Eric A. Posner, Agencies Should Ignore Distant-Future Generations, 74 U. CHI.
L. REV. 139, 141–42 (2007).
51 CHILDREN OF MEN (Universal Pictures 2006).
52 P.D. JAMES, THE CHILDREN OF MEN (1992).
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take for granted the existence of future generations, and an extreme
situation with no future generations at all.  In either case, we are faced
with the choice of whether to continue living lives that are guaranteed
to end in death.  In both cases, we thus have to choose between cur-
rent and future consumption on the basis of our own preferences,
while in a world with future generations we need to add our prefer-
ences about their well-being into our calculations about how much to
consume versus invest today.
The addition of considerations about future generations appears
to be a major complication, but it does not ultimately change the na-
ture of the choice between consumption and investment.  As I argue
later, in fact, the best approach to analyzing fiscal choices sets aside
the whole question of generational membership and simply focuses on
distributive issues both within and across generations.
F. Irreversibility
Although this Article explicitly sets aside environmental issues, it
is notable to compare the notion of irreversibility as it relates to envi-
ronmental harms versus economic harms.  As Louis Kaplow notes, “It
may be that due to the increasing marginal harm caused by certain
forms of environmental degradation, the existence of irreversibilities,
and certain forms of uncertainty, efficiency requires that a great deal
of investment be made to preserve the environment.”53  Species ex-
tinction and other irreversible harms appear to be fundamentally dif-
ferent from lower or higher rates of growth of material living
standards.  Similarly, global temperature change has a potentially
even greater claim as a policy concern because it is both irreversible
and universal, potentially leading to the end of life on the planet or
cataclysmic alterations in patterns of human and nonhuman life.
It is also true, however, that every lost economic opportunity is
tautologically irreversible.  That is, there is no way to get back a lost
economic opportunity once it is gone.  Leaving workers unemployed
for a year cannot be made up in subsequent years, even by having
employees work overtime, because they could have worked overtime
in subsequent years whether or not they were ever unemployed.
(Thus, not working overtime is itself an irreversible loss.)  Similarly,
the failure to set aside consumption today for investment in future
productivity can never be undone.  We might regret such a decision
53 Louis Kaplow, Discounting Dollars, Discounting Lives: Intergenerational Distributive
Justice and Efficiency, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 79, 117 (2007).
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and redouble our efforts in future years to mitigate the effects of our
mistake, but that redoubling is itself precisely the central question
raised by intergenerational tradeoffs.  Once we have failed to make an
investment in the past, any attempt to compensate for that choice is
costly and must be subjected to some form of balancing test.
Economic irreversibilities, however, are qualitatively different in
that what is lost is less unique than the kinds of environmental dam-
age that seem likely over the next several decades.  While a decision
to invest too little will lower future living standards, typically the dif-
ference is marginal and unlikely to threaten the continued existence of
life on the planet.
In that regard, errors in the economic realm are less worrisome
than errors in the environmental realm.  Although all errors are a
source of regret (or we would not think of them as errors), that we are
almost never operating at our maximum potential rate of resource
utilization, and that any failure to optimize is less than cataclysmic, are
a source of some peace.  The decisions that we make regarding current
versus future consumption are important, and in some cases can liter-
ally mean life and death, but rarely if ever are the decisions as fraught
with global peril as are our environmental choices.
G. Income Per Capita as the Measurement of Well-Being
Even after narrowing the analysis from implicating potentially
every question of public policy to addressing “only” questions of in-
tergenerational fiscal justice, it is necessary to justify the choice of a
measure of economic well-being.  Having chosen to follow the stan-
dard approach and focus on GDP (or income) per capita raises two
separate concerns: Why use GDP and not some other measure of
well-being?  And why measure well-being per capita instead of trying
to maximize the number of people who might enjoy being alive and
receiving the benefits of our (intergenerationally informed) policy
choices?
Gross domestic product and its variants within the National In-
come and Product Accounts have been the subject of serious debate
for as long as they have existed.  Decades ago, the economists William
Nordhaus and James Tobin proposed a “Measure of Economic Wel-
fare” as an alternative to GDP, attempting to incorporate leisure and
other non-market amenities into the aggregate measure of what peo-
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ple are enjoying by virtue of living in a given economy.54  In 1995, an
organization called Redefining Progress proposed an alternative to
the GDP that they called the Genuine Progress Indicator (“GPI”).55
The GPI explicitly takes environmental indicators into account as a
means to adjust GDP, arguably to better measure real well-being.56
The GPI consistently runs lower than GDP, and it has little or no
upward trend, unlike GDP.57  Similarly, some scholars refer to “inclu-
sive gross domestic product . . . , not just marketed goods and services,
but also leisure time, household production, and environmental
amenities.”58
Although these approaches significantly overlap, each is valuable
and almost certainly superior to GDP for many types of policy analy-
sis.  For present purposes, however, it is important not to allow possi-
ble complications from tradeoffs between non-market factors and
market goods and services to sidetrack the analysis.59  As mentioned
above, I plan to pursue these tradeoffs in a follow-up article.  Here,
though, I am reluctantly putting the environment aside and asking
only what tradeoffs we make when we raise or lower traditionally
measured economic output.
For most of the analysis here, the difference between GDP and
other measures will not be a central issue; but clearly one of the moti-
vating facts noted earlier—the high levels of forecast GDP per capita
for future generations—would not be nearly as dramatic if we used,
for example, the GPI measure that shows little or no growth even
when GDP is growing significantly.  Even looking at that alternative
variable, however, the core question of whether we owe future gener-
ations a higher GPI than we enjoy is no different than whether we
owe future generations a higher level of GDP.  We would simply be
54 William Nordhaus & James Tobin, Is Growth Obsolete?, in ECONOMIC GROWTH 1, 4–24
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Economic Research: Prospect & Retrospect Vol. 5, 1972).
55 Redefining Progress, Genuine Progress Indicator, http://www.rprogress.org/
sustainability_indicators/genuine_progress_indicator.htm (last visited July 5, 2009).
56 See JOHN TALBERTH ET AL., REDEFINING PROGRESS, THE GENUINE PROGRESS INDICA-
TOR 2006: A TOOL FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 1–2 (2007), http://www.rprogress.org/
publications/2007/GPI2006.pdf.
57 See id. at 18–21 figs.3 & 4.
58 Matthew D. Adler, Economic Growth and the Interests of Future (and Past and Present)
Generations: A Comment on Tyler Cowen, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 41, 41 (2007).
59 Cf. id. at 43–44 (“Whatever the connection between GDP and happiness, it seems very
plausible that there is a strong empirical connection between a society’s overall GDP and its
overall well-being (or, equivalently, between its per capita GDP and the average well-being of its
members).”).
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less confident that we have room to maneuver than we might be in
light of the high GDP forecasts noted above.
Even if we are comfortable using GDP as an imperfect measure
of well-being, though, the second concern in using GDP per capita is
the denominator.  Perhaps we should not be trying to maximize how
many marketed goods and services each person can consume because
that assumes that people are not valuable in and of themselves.  One
way to think about this is through the familiar and simple story of
diminishing marginal utility of goods.  If we believe that two people
are likely to have identical utility functions that climb less quickly as
they consume more goods, then splitting the goods between the two
raises total utility.
The objection, though, is potentially more profound.  If life itself
is highly valuable, then it is misguided to think about policies that af-
fect living standards but that ignore the potential increase in the well-
being of future generations that could be brought about simply by
making those future generations larger.
Those questions are clearly important, but I set them aside here
for two reasons.  First, any discussion that includes the possibility of
deliberately increasing future population levels (and that thus opens
up the policy analysis to matters of utility and not just production of
goods and services) immediately runs up against questions of resource
constraints and environmental justice.  The question is thus best ad-
dressed after having first explored the more limited (but still difficult)
fiscal questions raised below.
Second, depending on the assumptions that one is willing to make
about the intrinsic value of life, this additional consideration poten-
tially swamps all other issues raised by fiscal policy analysis.  If becom-
ing a person is infinitely valuable—or at least if it is subjectively more
valuable than any imaginable cost that might be imposed on others
through population pressures—then we need only worry about GDP
or any other measure of economic activity insomuch as it relates to
goods and services that can be used to increase human fertility.  The
extreme scenario is to use policy to try to maximize the number of
future births, no matter the effect that this might have on the average
age at death (except insomuch as early death would remove potential
fathers and mothers from the pool).
Although the extreme version of this argument is too outlandish
to merit a hearing, there are versions of the population question that
fall well short of that extreme case. Even so, those more nuanced
cases are better dealt with separately and must be set aside for current
2009] What Do We Owe Future Generations? 1265
purposes.  For better or worse, the analysis here implicitly takes popu-
lation growth as given and considers how to allocate the potential to
produce goods and services between current generations and future
generations (of whatever size happens to come into existence).
III. Is It Possible That We Are Being Too Generous
to Future Generations?
As described in the introduction to this Article, the belief that we
have obligations to future generations is pervasive as a normative
statement, even though the content of those obligations is almost com-
pletely unexamined.  The decision to take into account the interests of
future generations, whether we do so because we believe that we must
do so for philosophical reasons or simply because we feel an inchoate
moral desire to care for future people, puts us in a difficult position.
How do we strike the best balance between making ourselves happy
and trying to do what we can for future people?  “If respecting future
generations means anything, it should mean respecting our best guess
as to their wishes and helping them as much as feasible.”60  Putting an
analytical structure behind such respect is the difficult work of in-
tergenerational policy analysis.
Having noted that virtually every area of public policy might well
be open to claims that policy choices must take into account the inter-
ests of future generations, it would be unwise to assert here that fiscal
policy commentators are uniquely preoccupied with such claims.  It is
clear, however, that many if not most of the central debates about
fiscal policy lend themselves quite well to concerns about the interests
of future generations.  It would seem to require a special effort to ig-
nore the fact that fiscal policy choices will have effects on people who
are not yet born (or, if born, are not yet in a position to participate
directly in the process of making decisions that will affect their eco-
nomic futures).
Among the ranks of policy research organizations devoted to fis-
cal issues, the Concord Coalition came into existence in direct re-
sponse to concerns that the levels of federal budget deficits in the
1980s and early 1990s were dangerously high.61  The organization’s
website prominently includes the following statement: “[F]iscal re-
sponsibility is as much of a moral duty as it is an economic con-
60 Dexter Samida & David A. Weisbach, Paretian Intergenerational Discounting, 74 U.
CHI. L. REV. 145, 155 (2007).
61 See The Concord Coalition, History, http://www.concordcoalition.org/about-us/history
(last visited July 5, 2009).
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cern. . . .  Fiscal responsibility is essential to creating a better, stronger,
more prosperous nation for the next generation.  The choices we
make today—or fail to make—will determine what kind of future our
children and grandchildren inherit 20 and 40 years from now.”62  Simi-
larly, the Tax Policy Center, a joint undertaking of the Brookings In-
stitution and the Urban Institute, “examines the implications of
current policies and proposed tax changes for future generations.”63
This focus is understandable, but as we see below, the focus might well
be misplaced or, at least, overemphasized.
A. Competing over Whose Fiscal Policy Prescriptions Are Better for
Future Generations
Although the moral stance taken by the Concord Coalition might
be stated more explicitly than one usually sees in discussions of eco-
nomic policy, the interests of future generations are never far from
fiscal policy debates.  The familiar question of crowding out, where
the central concern is whether government policies are reducing fu-
ture growth by replacing productive private investment with unpro-
ductive government consumption,64 is of course motivated by
concerns about how choices that we make today might affect the fu-
ture.  It is true, of course, that a person whose concerns did not extend
beyond the end of her own life could still be concerned about the path
of growth until her death; but the intensity of the concern grows as the
time span lengthens.
The most prominent recent example of a fiscal policy debate that
is centrally concerned with future generations is the controversy over
so-called generational accounting (including the calculation of a long-
term budget deficit measure called the “fiscal gap”).65  Advocates of
the generational accounting framework, including its creators Alan
Auerbach and Laurence Kotlikoff along with other scholars in eco-
nomics and legal academia, have argued that the generational ac-
counts provide a superior method of assessing the effects of fiscal
policy on future economic performance, and they argue explicitly that
current generations are inappropriately ignoring the effects of current
and projected levels of deficit spending on the well-being of future
62 The Concord Coalition, Why Is Fiscal Responsibility Important?, http://www.con-
cordcoalition.org/issues/primers/fiscal-responsibility.html (last visited July 5, 2009).
63 Tax Policy Center, About Us, http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/aboutus/mission.cfm (last
visited July 5, 2009).
64 See Buchanan, Good Deficits, supra note 3, at 335–39.
65 See Buchanan, Long-Term Deficits, supra note 3, at 307–10.
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generations.66  The time frame analyzed is at least seventy-five years,67
even though advocates of generational accounts prefer an infinite time
horizon.68  Such a policy approach would make little sense unless its
advocates were deeply concerned about the effects of today’s policies
on future generations.69
Opponents of the generational accounting approach have not
challenged the intergenerational concerns that motivate the approach
but have rather taken those concerns as given, challenging instead the
assumptions and methods used to generate estimates of the fiscal gap
and the generational accounts.70  In a recent article, for example, I
argued that estimates of the fiscal gap are based on an inappropriate
set of assumptions about which variables are assumed to change over
the decades and which are held constant.71  Although I raised the
question of intergenerational justice very tentatively in that article, I
explicitly took the position that the generational accounting frame-
work was inferior to current budgetary conventions even for those
who are concerned about future generations.72  Others who have criti-
qued the generational accounts have similarly shared its stated goals
of intergenerational justice, however loosely defined.73
Other macroeconomic debates in the fiscal policy literature have
similarly been focused on means and not ends.  For example, in re-
sponse to the standard crowding out arguments, Benjamin Friedman
wrote an influential article in the mid-1970s showing how it is possible
66 Id. at 281–83 & nn.8–12.
67 See, e.g., Auerbach, Gokhale & Kotlikoff, supra note 35, at 77 (using projections from
1992 through 2066).
68 See Buchanan, Long-Term Deficits, supra note 3, at 321.
69 As I discuss below, there is also an aspect of the generational accounting framework
that is oriented toward concerns about how current policies might lead to near-term catastrophe.
The general thrust of the generational accounting literature, however, is clearly focused on mul-
tigenerational concerns.
70 The generational accounts literature often presents estimates of the “lifetime net tax
rates” faced by various generations as a way to frame the debate about fiscal policies. See
Michael Doran, Intergenerational Equity in Fiscal Policy Reform, 61 TAX L. REV. 241, 274
(2008).  No matter what one thinks about intergenerational obligations, it is worth noting that
future generations, if they care about their real level of well-being, would not be directly con-
cerned with their tax rates.  Tax rates, whether in a given year or over a lifetime, are only rele-
vant in comparison to the size of the base that is being taxed.  Instead, we would try to balance
the real living standards (net of tax) of present versus future generations.
71 Buchanan, Long-Term Deficits, supra note 3, at 310–15.
72 Id.
73 See, e.g., Doran, supra note 70 at 276 (“Although they provide interesting analytic infor-
mation, fiscal gap and generational accounting do not move us closer to answering the question
whether current fiscal policy or any specific reform to current fiscal policy is fair to current and
future generations.”).
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for fiscal policy to “crowd in” private investment.74  With sufficient
slack in the economy, running deficits could make it more profitable
for private enterprises to increase their spending on productive invest-
ments, thus making government spending and private investment
spending complements rather than substitutes.  Empirical estimates
included in my doctoral dissertation confirmed this effect twenty years
after Friedman’s research.75  The effect would also work in the oppo-
site direction, with contractionary policies such as tax increases (that
would presumably be enacted with the intent to reduce government
deficits and thus reduce crowding out) leading to reductions in output
and thus paradoxically to reductions in private investment.
The consensus that emerged regarding the crowding in concept
was either that the effect is unimportant or that it is a short-run phe-
nomenon (the former claim being far from universally held, the latter
claim being consistent with my empirical research).  Even temporary
changes in investment and output can affect at least the levels of fu-
ture living standards, however, so a failure to take advantage of
crowding in opportunities might well end up affecting future as well as
current generations.  Again, the debate was never about whether it
might not be a bad thing to lower future output but rather how to
make our grandchildren richer—or at least how to make ourselves
richer without harming our grandchildren.
In the public and political debates over fiscal policy, the question
is almost uniformly framed as one of whose policy proposals will best
protect the interests of future generations.  In response to those who
favor reducing deficit spending, two arguments are common in current
U.S. policy debates.  The first, generally associated with political con-
servatives, is the supply-side argument that tax cuts—even if they re-
sult in increased fiscal deficits—are needed to raise future growth
rates and thus to improve the fortunes of both current and future gen-
erations.  Although the academic literature has been generally unkind
to these assertions, advocates of tax cuts are tireless in their efforts to
justify such cuts on this basis.  For this Article, the point is not
whether supply-siders are correct in their policy prescriptions but that
they proceed from the same assumption that motivates their oppo-
74 Benjamin M. Friedman, Crowding Out and Crowding In? Economic Consequences of
Financing Government Deficits, 1978 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 593, 639–40
(Arthur M. Okun & George L. Perry eds.).
75 Neil H. Buchanan, Debt, Deficits, and Fiscal Policy: Three Essays, at ch. 3 (1996) (Ph.D.
dissertation, Harvard University).  The relevant chapter was published as The Effects of the Fis-
cal Deficit on the Composition of U.S. GDP: An Analysis of Disaggregated Data, in IMPROVING
THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 133, 133–71 (Paul Davidson & Jan A. Kregel eds., 1997).
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nents, i.e., that it would be bad to reduce the fortunes of our descend-
ants through fiscal policy—in the case of supply-siders, to harm future
generations by failing to reduce tax rates as much as possible.76
Similarly, those generally on the political left who favor public
investment frame their arguments inside the familiar territory of how
we can best assist future generations.  In a recent law review article,
for example, I argued that it is important to remember that public
spending is not always wasted, and it is not even always spent on con-
sumption (wasted or virtuous).77  A logical underpinning of the crowd-
ing out argument is that it is total investment that matters (and the
strength of the investment projects undertaken in terms of generating
future growth), not whether the investment is labeled private invest-
ment or government investment.  The policy implication is that it is
not deficits that matter per se but the composition of government
spending versus the private spending that it might crowd out.
This is not so much a separate theory as a reminder that how
public spending is accounted for can have profound effects on our
ability to determine the best way to increase future growth.  Skeptics
are rightly concerned that policy makers might be tempted to justify
wasteful spending by relabeling it as public investment, and thus it
would be important to prevent such potential abuse in any plan to
separately account for government consumption and government in-
vestment spending.  In a new article-in-progress, I am attempting to
create just such a framework.  Success along such lines would allow
the “government consumption versus private investment” crowding
out debate to be recast as a “productive investment versus nonproduc-
tive spending” debate; though this debate is still about crowding out, it
is not fixated on the public or private source of funds.
To repeat the now-familiar refrain, however, this debate also
takes as a given that it would be a bad idea to enact policies that
would reduce the growth rate of the economy below what it would
otherwise be.  The question of whether we are already doing enough
for future generations—much less whether we might not be obligated
to do anything for them at all—is simply not part of the policy debate.
As discussed above, it is not as obvious as it might seem that we are
honor-bound to frame our policy discussions around the requirement
that we avoid reducing economic growth below its baseline level.
76 I am, however, unaware of any scholarship adopting the supply-side view that also pro-
vides guidance as to how low tax rates can be cut before the resulting deficits might do more
harm than the tax-rate cuts will do good.
77 See Buchanan, Good Deficits, supra note 3, at 343–46.
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B. The Future Already Looks Surprisingly Good
The discussion above referred somewhat loosely to a baseline
rate of either investment or growth that current policy makers should
not only protect but should affirmatively try to improve upon.  Fiscal
decisions today that can raise future living standards seem to enjoy a
presumption of virtue, while those that lower future living standards
are highly suspect.  If the expectation were that this baseline was nec-
essary simply to maintain current living standards, there might be at
least a strong intuitive sense that we should not make future genera-
tions worse off than we are.78  As I noted above, even this assumption
can be challenged, but it does have the virtue of being simple and
intuitive.  If we believe in this simple definition of progress, then we
obviously should avoid moving in the wrong direction, i.e., we must
not allow living standards to fall.
As is well known, the aging of the Baby Boomers—the large co-
hort of people born in the two decades immediately following World
War II—raises a number of important policy questions, most obvi-
ously whether various countries will be forced to alter their retirement
systems as a relatively smaller work force faces the prospect of sup-
porting a relatively larger population of retirees.  Standard analyses of
these policy questions have often been couched in the language of in-
tergenerational justice, with scholars typically expressing concern that
currently-living generations are harming future generations by refus-
ing to change policies that will ultimately require large changes in fu-
ture benefits or taxes.  This, it is assumed (or sometimes stated
bluntly), is unfair to future generations.
It turns out, however, that the probable baseline against which we
are legislating includes significantly higher average living standards
for future generations than we ourselves will ever enjoy.  Perhaps
more surprisingly, such increases in prosperity are likely notwithstand-
ing the aging of the Baby Boom generation, with even pessimistic
forecasts showing impressively high cumulative economic growth
leading to very high average future living standards.  In a recent arti-
cle,79 I reported the results of calculations based on the 2006 Social
Security Trustees’ Report, which projects population growth rates,
GDP growth rates, etc., over a 75-year horizon on the basis of three
sets of assumptions: the High-Cost Scenario (relatively pessimistic as-
78 See supra pp. 1257–58.
79 Neil H. Buchanan, Social Security and Government Deficits: When Should We Worry?,
92 CORNELL L. REV. 257 (2007) [hereinafter Buchanan, When Should We Worry?].
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sumptions), the Mid-Range Scenario (assumptions that are relatively
pessimistic compared to recent decades but are less pessimistic than in
the high-cost scenario), and the Low-Cost Scenario (assumptions that
are below recent trends but that are the most optimistic of the three
scenarios that the Trustees provide).80  Even under the most pessimis-
tic official projections of retirement obligations, I found that material
standards of living in the United States will more than double by
2080.81
I have since updated those projections based on the Trustees’
2009 report.82  Notably, even the Low-Cost Scenario (the relatively
optimistic scenario) is still based on assumed annual economic growth
rates that are significantly lower than the average for the last forty
years or more.  Specifically, the average annual rate of GDP growth
from 1960 through 2008 was just under 3.2%.83  The High-Cost, Mid-
Range, and Low-Cost forecasts assume average annual growth rates
through 2085 of 1.5%, 2.2%, and 2.9%, respectively.84  The difference
between a 3.2% annual growth rate and a 2.9% rate might seem small,
but with compound growth the difference can become significant.
Over a 75-year span, for example, $1 compounds to $8.53 at a 2.9%
annual rate but grows to $10.62 at a 3.2% rate, meaning that 0.3%
added to the annual rate of growth compounds to a 25% difference
over the longer time period.85
80 Id. at 277.
81 Id. at 266 n.57 (projecting an increase in per capita GDP of 131% from 2005 through
2080 under the high-cost scenario).
82 THE 2009 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE FEDERAL OLD-AGE
AND SURVIVORS INSURANCE AND FEDERAL DISABILITY INSURANCE TRUST FUNDS, H.R. DOC.
NO. 111-41, at 85–86 tbl.V.A2, 103–04 tbl.V.B2 (2009), available at http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/
TR/2009/tr09.pdf, [hereinafter 2009 TRUSTEES’ REPORT].  During my oral presentation at the
Future Generations symposium in October 2008, I relied on data from the 2008 version of the
Trustees’ Report.  The editing schedule for this issue permitted me to update my estimates here
based on the 2009 data.  As I discuss in my article replying to the comments of the scholars on
the symposium’s fiscal policy panel, even the severe recession in the United States that began in
December 2007 has not substantially changed the long-term forecasts under any of the three
scenarios.  All of the forecasts continue to imply that average per capita living standards will at
least double by 2085 and could triple or more than quadruple. See Neil H. Buchanan, Four out
of Four Panelists Agree: U.S. Fiscal Policy Does Not Cheat Future Generations, 77 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1402, 1404 (2009) [hereinafter Buchanan, Four out of Four].
83 Author’s calculations based on data provided in 2009 TRUSTEES’ REPORT, supra note
82.
84 Id.
85 Again, these estimates are necessarily imprecise. The differences in the overall forecasts
are so large, however, that it would require enormous and unprecedented changes in the econ-
omy even to begin to reduce such significant differences.
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Especially given the notable pessimism of the assumptions under-
lying the Trustees’ forecasts, the results of these computations are, in a
word, stunning: “Using the GDP growth rates in the high-cost as-
sumptions, per capita GDP more than doubles, rising by 131% in
2080.  In the intermediate scenario, per capita income more than tri-
ples (rising by 225%), while in the low-cost scenario, per capita in-
come more than quadruples (rising by 342%).”86  Updating those
estimates using the forecasts from the 2009 Trustees’ Report, per cap-
ita GDP is forecast to rise by 135% from 2005 through 2080 in the
High-Cost Scenario, by 219% in the intermediate scenario, and by
332% in the Low-Cost Scenario.87  With small variations, therefore,
the results in 2009 mirror those in 2006, with even the most pessimistic
scenario showing income per capita more than doubling by 2080.
As noted, these forecasts are if anything on the pessimistic end of
the spectrum.  To be sure, economic forecasts are often proved wrong,
with some forecasts proving to be very wide of the mark even when
predicting over a one-year time frame (such as the oft-revised annual
federal budget deficit forecasts).  The estimates from the Social Secur-
ity Trustees, however, have been very steady over the years, and the
scale of revisions necessary to result in a forecast of zero net growth
(or something even close to that level) over a several-decade span ap-
pear to be beyond reason.  Short of unpredictable cataclysms
(weather-related disasters, world war, the collapse of global capital-
ism), these forecasts are apparently among the most solid available.
(That the forecasts are essentially unchanged even after taking into
account the current extreme economic downturn provides additional
reason to be confident that the overall optimistic picture depicted
here will not turn out to be wishful thinking.)
86 Buchanan, When Should We Worry?, supra note 79, at 266 n.57.  While updating the
estimates to include the more recent numbers from the 2009 Trustees’ Report, I discovered a
minor computational error underlying one of the estimates reported in my Cornell article.
Under the Low-Cost Scenario, the aggregate growth in per capita GDP through 2080 comes out
to 348%, not 342%.  No one should, of course, have confidence in the accuracy of these esti-
mates to such a fine level of precision.  That the estimates show GDP per capita more than
quadrupling in the Low-Cost Scenario, while it triples in the intermediate scenario and doubles
even in the High-Cost Scenario—and that those estimated multiples carry over to the updated
figures reported here—is the key finding from these computations.
87 Author’s calculations available upon request.  To compare the results of computations
based on the 2009 Trustees’ Report with those from the 2006 Trustees’ Report, I use the same
starting date (2005) and ending date (2080), even though the 2009 Trustees’ Report extends the
forecasts through 2085.  The results of computations based on the extended forecasts are re-
ported in Buchanan, Four out of Four, supra note 82, at 1404–05.
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The question posed in the title of this paper thus becomes even
more pointed because the baseline below which policy analysts are
determined not to allow future living standards to dip is not our cur-
rent level but a level that is at least more than double the current
average living standard and possibly as high as almost four-and-a-half
times the current average.
Thus, it is notable that no one seems to have asked (except in
very isolated instances, as noted earlier) whether we are already meet-
ing our intergenerational obligations.  If future generations will almost
certainly be significantly richer than current generations, why must
current generations make still more sacrifices to prevent any erosion
in the (much higher) living standards of future generations?
Again, this formulation of the question is deliberately provoca-
tive, ignoring as it does questions about income distribution, environ-
mental concerns, and so on.  As a starting point, though, it recasts the
question of intergenerational fairness in a way that strongly suggests
that current policy debates should at least take into account the differ-
ences in income levels between current and future generations as we
decide whether we should enact policies that will tilt the tradeoff in
favor of, or against, future generations.
C. Macroeconomic Growth Theory
As just noted, the stylized fact that to a large degree motivates
the writing of this Article is the observation that—notwithstanding the
frequent expressions of concern by academics, politicians, and others
about the effects of our current fiscal policies on future generations—
even the relatively pessimistic forecasts point to a notably positive fu-
ture, as measured by per capita GDP.  Even with the aging of Baby
Boomers, changes in productivity will apparently be more than suffi-
cient to offset the demographic changes and allow future GDP per
capita to grow dramatically over the next seventy-five years and per-
haps beyond.
Perhaps this is not good enough, however.  It is always possible to
argue that we are not doing enough and must do more.  Even for per-
sonal decisions regarding how much to save for one’s own retirement,
studies “always come to one conclusion: No matter how much you are
saving for retirement, it isn’t enough, and you should save much,
much more.  So you’d better stop spending money on anything related
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to your present life . . . . [and] should immediately cease eating out,
going to movies and buying things so [you] can save even more.”88
Applied to an intergenerational context, the argument becomes
that we can always do a bit more for future generations, allowing them
to have even higher standards of living if only we would stop spoiling
ourselves.  The logic of saving and sacrificing becomes self-reinforc-
ing, and it becomes difficult to know when to declare victory.  Admit-
tedly, the United States is renowned for its supposedly low savings
rates,89 but the point is not the savings rate but future growth.  If we
are managing our economic affairs sufficiently well that we are be-
queathing real standards of living more than two to four times higher
than our current living standards, why is that not enough?
The country most often held up as a paragon of saving and sacri-
fice for the future is, of course, Japan.90  That sacrifice did indeed lead
to impressive increases in living standards for a generation or two af-
ter World War II.91  Interestingly, though, saving rather than consum-
ing can lead to difficult questions of when the people will be allowed
to enjoy the fruits of their sacrifice.  Even aware of their country’s
economic might (prior to that country’s “lost decade” of economic
depression and stagnation in the 1990s), Japanese citizens did not be-
lieve that they were affluent.92  When the reward for more saving is
the admonition to save still more, the path to prosperity begins to look
more like a treadmill.
Nations at war are perhaps the best example of the difficult trade-
offs between sacrifice and consumption.93  Because the consequences
of overconsumption are potentially so disastrous (one less weapon be-
ing built, leading to the loss of the war), there are especially strong
arguments to cut back consumption to bare subsistence levels.  In
peaceful times, though, how can we balance the needs of current ver-
88 Phyllis Korkki, Yes, Retirement Still Seems an Impossible Dream, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1,
2007, § 3, at 2.
89 See, e.g., Robert H. Frank, Americans Save So Little, But What, if Anything, Can Be
Done to Change That?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2005, at C2.
90 See WILLIAM T. ZIEMBA & SANDRA L. SCHWARTZ, POWER JAPAN: HOW AND WHY THE
JAPANESE ECONOMY WORKS 23–24 (1992) (describing Japan’s comparatively high household
savings rate).
91 See Stephen B. Wickman, The Character and Structure of the Economy, in JAPAN: A
COUNTRY STUDY 141, 192 (Frederica M. Bunge ed., 1983).
92 See ZIEMBA & SCHWARTZ, supra note 90, at 106.
93 It cannot pass without mention that, as many have already noted, the current situation is
apparently the only time in our history that Americans have not been asked to sacrifice during a
war.
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sus future generations, when it seems that we should always be con-
vincing ourselves to do a bit more for our grandchildren?
The most well-known and widely accepted tool for analyzing the
tradeoffs between present and future consumption is the Solow
Growth Model, named after the economist Robert Solow.  Solow’s
model is used prominently in a number of leading economics text-
books, including N. Gregory Mankiw’s advanced undergraduate
text,94 making the Solow model the preferred method for explaining
economic growth to millions of economics students worldwide.
Setting aside the technical details, the Solow model builds a
framework around the notion of steady-state equilibrium, in which cit-
izens and economic policymakers make annual choices between sav-
ing and consumption, with the saving being invested in capital goods
that are productive but that also wear out at predictable rates.95  The
steady state is defined as the situation where the capital stock per
worker is not changing over time, that is, where the society is setting
aside sufficient saving each year to replace the capital that has
depreciated.96
Because a wide range of capital stocks could be maintained in a
steady state, Solow asked whether there was any particular steady
state capital stock that was arguably more desirable than any other.
The so-called “Golden Rule” level of steady-state capital per worker
is the level that will maximize steady-state consumption.97  One of the
key features of the Solow model, therefore, is its ability to demon-
strate how it is possible to overinvest as well as to underinvest.  If a
society attempts to maintain a capital stock that is larger than the
Golden Rule level, maintenance of that large amount of capital as it
depreciates requires more sacrifice of consumption than it is worth.
Reducing the capital stock per worker does reduce output, but it is
worth it do so because the loss of output is smaller than the amount of
depreciation that otherwise had to be replaced.
The Solow model would thus seem to answer the question of in-
tergenerational balancing, telling us how to find a level of capital that
will maximize consumption for all future generations.  With techno-
logical change, moreover, maintaining the Golden Rule level of capi-
tal per worker can lead to increasing standards of living over time for
94 N. GREGORY MANKIW, MACROECONOMICS passim (4th ed. 2000).
95 See id. at 90–91.
96 Id.
97 Id.
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all future generations without requiring excess sacrifice from earlier
generations.
The major complication arises when the capital stock is not at its
Golden Rule level.  Mankiw’s text offers a relatively simple calcula-
tion, suggesting that “the capital stock in the U.S. economy is well
below the Golden Rule level.”98  There is a surprising dearth of re-
search on this question, but even taking Mankiw’s tentative conclu-
sion seriously, the process of moving from a position below the
Golden Rule level of capital per worker up to the Golden Rule level is
costly to the current generation (and perhaps also to several genera-
tions to follow): “When the economy begins below the Golden Rule,
reaching the Golden Rule requires initially reducing consumption to
increase consumption in the future.”99
Does the model itself offer a method of deciding whether to sacri-
fice current consumption for future consumption; and if it does, does
it tell us how quickly we should do so?  Mankiw’s discussion (which is
simplified for his untrained audience) notes that “current . . . and fu-
ture consumers are not always the same people.”100  After noting that
a policymaker who cares more about current generations than future
generations will not choose to move to the Golden Rule level,
Mankiw argues that a policymaker who cares “about all generations
equally” will choose the Golden Rule because, “[e]ven though current
generations will consume less, an infinite number of future genera-
tions will benefit.”101  He pushes the point further by arguing that if
we heed the biblical Golden Rule, “we give all generations equal
weight.  In this case, it is optimal to reach the Golden Rule level of
capital—which is why it is called the ‘Golden Rule.’”102
Even though Mankiw’s analysis stipulates at least the possibility
that a social planner might choose to favor one generation over an-
other, his argument amounts to a moral assertion that “an infinite
number of future generations” should not be held hostage to the
desires of today’s generation not to sacrifice and move toward the
Golden Rule.  Even a rudimentary knowledge of discounting, though,
suggests that it is possible for the losses of an infinite series of future
generations to add up to less than the gains of one or more current
generations—even if one takes a simple utilitarian approach to mea-
98 Id. at 112.
99 Id. at 96 (italics not reproduced).
100 Id. at 96–97.
101 Id. at 97.
102 Id.
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suring well-being.  More broadly, it is simply an open question as to
whether the potential loss of future incomes (especially if, again, fu-
ture incomes are already going to be higher than today’s incomes)
justifies a sacrifice on the part of current generations.
Indeed, Solow readily concedes that his theory has nothing to say
about intergenerational balancing because his model specifically in-
cludes a parameter, j, that represents the marginal social utility of con-
sumption.  “The larger j is, the more sharply the marginal social utility
of consumption falls, and therefore the more the [policy maker] is
likely to favour poor people—ourselves—against rich people—our
descendants.”103
In short, although growth theory does an excellent job of demon-
strating the fallacy that it is always more virtuous to save more and
thus to build an ever-larger capital stock, it is simply not designed to
answer the questions about intergenerational balancing that fiscal
policymaking requires.  Returning to basic philosophical approaches
to justice is thus both necessary and potentially enlightening.
D. Rawlsianism, Utilitarianism, and Intergenerational Fiscal Policy
The starting point for many analyses of distributive justice, of
course, is the philosophy of John Rawls.  The most direct reference in
Rawls’s work to the question of intergenerational obligations is his
discussion of “the problem of justice between generations.”104  Unfor-
tunately, although he at least formulates the issue in terms of a bal-
ance between the interests of different generations, Rawls concludes
(without much analysis or elaboration) that each generation “must
also put aside in each period of time a suitable amount of real capital
accumulation.”105  This leaves us to ponder how best to determine
what is a “suitable amount”—a quandary that is especially tricky if we
take seriously the notion that future generations are already likely to
be richer than current generations.
1. Rawls and the Limits of the Veil of Ignorance
The standard Rawlsian approach to distributive justice begins
with the notion of the so-called Veil of Ignorance.106  Rawls posited a
hypothetical choice, where a person stands outside of a society and
knows the range of possible situations in which people in a given soci-
103 ROBERT M. SOLOW, GROWTH THEORY: AN EXPOSITION 79 (2d ed. 2000).
104 See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 251–59 (rev ed. 1999).
105 Id. at 252.
106 See id. at 118–23.
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ety might find themselves (princes, paupers, healthy, sick, etc.) as well
as the likelihood of a random person’s being in any specific social po-
sition.107  No person, however, can know in advance whether they will
be one of the lucky ones or the unlucky ones.108  Each person would
then, while still ignorant of their ultimate position in a society, agree
or refuse to roll the dice and allow herself to become part of a particu-
lar society.
Rawls’s supposition was that people would generally reject the
risk of living in a society in which the privation of the least well-off
was too extreme (as well as, possibly, where the distance between the
best- and least-well-off was too great).109  One can, of course, imagine
a self-interested individual who might agree to enter a society with
some number of desperately needy members, if the likelihood of be-
ing one of the needy few is sufficiently low and the rewards of being
one of the fortunate are sufficiently high.  Rawls’s point, however, was
not that anyone actually faces such a choice but that the intellectual
exercise of imagining such a choice behind a veil of ignorance could
make palpable the notion that society has a responsibility to prevent
innocents from being the losers of a cosmic lottery, living their lives in
extreme (absolute or relative) want.
One of the most important benefits of Rawlsian analysis, there-
fore, is that it provides a philosophical underpinning for the altruistic
“but for the grace of God, there go I” notion of social obligation.  The
real-world implication of Rawls’s analysis is that redistribution of in-
come and wealth from rich to poor can be justified as a remedy
against the fundamental unfairness of accidents of birth.  Redistribu-
tion makes a society more appealing from behind a veil of ignorance,
at least to those with sufficient empathy to imagine being one of the
unlucky members of their society.
Rawls was, therefore, most concerned with the well-being of the
least well-off members of society.  In the context of comparing gener-
ations across time, therefore, concern for the least well-off would
seemingly translate into a concern for the least wealthy generations.
Using this approach, it would thus be clearly unacceptable to transfer
resources from a relatively poor generation to a relatively rich one;
and it would similarly seem imperative to move resources from the
rich to the poor.  This would suggest that—rather than heeding the
oft-heard calls to reduce current living standards for the benefit of
107 See id. at 119.
108 See id. at 118.
109 See id. at 130–32.
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future generations—we should consume more today even though do-
ing so could lower future living standards because this would effect a
transfer from the relatively rich to the relatively poor.110
The concerns that motivated Rawls, however, were not simply a
matter of looking at who had the smallest incomes and trying to help
those individuals by transferring resources to them from those with
more to give.111  He was not, in other words, advocating some mechan-
ical and arbitrary narrowing of living standards for its own sake.  He
was instead concerned that the least fortunate were excluded from full
participation in society.112  The Rawlsian concern with full citizenship
is based on the recognition that being poor almost invariably means
being socially and politically powerless.  Narrowing the extremes of
wealth and poverty not only empowers the poor to become full citi-
zens, it also prevents the rich from inappropriately dominating the po-
litical and social life of society.
None of these concerns, however, translates smoothly into an in-
tergenerational context, especially when we are comparing the well-
being of different generations of Americans in a post-industrial econ-
omy.  The majority of Americans, fortunately, do not live in poverty,
and the concerns with basic liberties that motivated Rawls do not ap-
pear to arise when comparing the majority of Americans today to the
majority of Americans who will be alive fifty or one hundred years
from now.  It is certainly true that each generation will face different
constraints and have different opportunities, but it seems implausi-
ble—indeed, it seems to miss the point entirely—to equate the situa-
tion of the current average citizen in the United States with that of a
person whose position is so unacceptable that anyone behind a veil of
ignorance would be unwilling to risk living in a world where a person
might occupy such a position.
In fact, on a fundamental level, the concerns that motivated
Rawls are reversed in the intergenerational context.  As Rawls put it:
“Justice does not require that early generations save so that later ones
are simply more wealthy.  Saving is demanded as a condition of bring-
ing about the full realization of just institutions and the equal liber-
110 As discussed below, see infra Part IV, this is no longer true if we disaggregate the analy-
sis and look at income distribution within generations rather than looking at averages.
111 For an excellent discussion of Rawls’s thought on questions of inequality, see generally
Linda Sugin, Theories of Distributive Justice and Limitations on Taxation: What Rawls Demands
from Tax Systems, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1991 (2004).
112 Cf. id. at 2007 n.71 (“Rawls would assure a decent social minimum covering basic
needs . . . .”).
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ties.”113  Rawls’s concern was therefore with whether people could
enjoy the full benefits of citizenship and humanity; his theory would
call for us to intervene only when it is necessary to do so to prevent
the subjugation of a disadvantaged person or group.114
From an intergenerational perspective, by contrast, it is the cur-
rent (relatively poor) generations who are making decisions without
the participation of the future (relatively rich) generations.  If any-
thing, current generations have the power to make future people truly
miserable (or even never to exist at all) with only their own con-
sciences to stop them from doing so.  Viewed from that perspective, it
is actually rather impressive that human beings have done as much as
they have over the millennia to improve the lives of future genera-
tions.  At the very least, however, it suggests that the motivating con-
cerns in the Rawlsian approach are simply absent in the
intergenerational context.  Rawlsian arguments in favor of intragener-
ational redistribution have little or no resonance intergenerationally
precisely because it is the least well-off who hold all the power.
2. Utilitarianism and Generational Transfers
Simple utilitarianism, on the other hand, would appear to argue
unambiguously in favor of redistributing from future generations to
current generations.  Making the usual assumptions that individual
utilities can be compared and are not dominated by logical difficulties
such as “utility monsters,”115 an intergenerational comparison is no
different from an intragenerational one.  If a future generation is go-
ing to have higher incomes than a current generation, redistribution
across time from the future to the present will increase total utility.
Special assumptions can always be added, but as a starting point, in-
tergenerational redistribution in the backward direction seems to be
where the theory points.116
113 RAWLS, supra note 104, at 257.
114 See Sugin, supra note 111, at 2005–07 (discussing Rawls’s requirement that a just society
provide everyone with a core set of “basic liberties”).
115 See, e.g., Buchanan, Long-Term Deficits, supra note 3, at 324 (describing “utility mon-
sters” as “rich people whose subjective enjoyment from increased consumption is so much
greater than other people’s enjoyment that a utility-maximizing social planner would continue to
shift consumption to them from poor people because the monsters’ increase in happiness is, in
the aggregate, worth it” and noting “[r]edistribution from poor to rich, under such an assump-
tion, would increase total utility”).
116 In an introductory note summarizing the papers in a symposium on intergenerational
equity, Weisbach and Sunstein conclude that “[t]he major question comes down to the choice of
a discount rate.”  Weisbach & Sunstein, supra note 18, at 1.  They further note, though, that
“[m]ost of the authors also believe the precise discount rate depends on a variety of empirical as
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Shaviro, for example, describes a “straight utilitarian framework”
which would aim “to maximize aggregate well-being over time,
[with] . . . no specific duty to future generations other than weighing
their welfare equally per capita with ours.”117  “[S]ubject to concern
about its efficiency costs,” Shaviro concedes that if one assumes that
wealth has diminishing marginal utility, “one might think that utilitari-
anism offers support for significant redistribution from future to cur-
rent generations, assuming again that technology really does assure
that things will continue to improve.”118  Shaviro offers three brief ar-
guments as to why the fiscal policy adopted by the Bush Administra-
tion might be too present-oriented,119 the third of which is relevant
here.  He argues, in short, that we might push things too far, i.e., that
we might take so much away from future generations that we will not
equalize incomes across generations but will instead change who gets
to be rich and who must live in relative poverty.120  Even taking that
argument at face value, this is not an argument against redistribution
from the future rich to the current relatively non-rich but rather an
argument that it is possible to overdo it.  If the economic forecasts
provided by the Social Security Trustees are at all reliable, though, the
most pessimistic path implied by our current policy regime still results
well as ethical factors, such as the estimate of the future productivity of the economy.” Id. at 3
(emphasis added).  Therefore, the likely relative income of future generations will matter in
determining the justice of a decision to shift resources from a richer future to a relatively poorer
present.  Standard assumptions about diminishing marginal utility can easily support this conclu-
sion, as implied in my discussion above regarding Mankiw’s arguments about the Golden Rule
and in the discussion below.
117 Shaviro, supra note 28, at 1331.
118 Id.
119 Shaviro’s first two arguments are that it is possible that future generations might have
more valuable things on which to spend their money, such as brain cancer cures that are not
currently available, and that the longer lives of future generations will require them to have
more resources. Id. at 1332.  Neither argument is convincing, however, if one confines oneself to
a utilitarian framework.  First, if brain cancer cures become available in the future, and if people
value those cures highly, then utilitarian analysis implies that those future people can decide how
much of their resources to devote to buying brain cancer cures as opposed to, say, buying flying
cars and facial transplants.  Individual utility maximization would still, under the usual assump-
tions, allow people to make choices that would allocate cancer cures and all other goods to their
highest-valued uses.  Second, and similarly, the likelihood that future people will live longer lives
does not compel their being given greater resources.  They will face the same choice faced by
everyone living in any time period, i.e., how much to work (and for how many years) such that
they will have a standard of living that is acceptable to them, given their preferences.  If any-
thing, that they will have more healthy years to accumulate savings for their retirement years is
an argument they will require less “seed money” than do people today whose lives are shorter
and less healthy.
120 See id. (“We simply may be imposing too great a burden on [future generations] for it to
be worth the benefit to us even if our marginal utility of a dollar is greater than theirs . . . .”).
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in incomes more than doubling over the next seventy-five years.121
The possibility of a crisis arising before then, which appears to ani-
mate Shaviro’s argument,122 is a very legitimate but separate concern,
as I discuss below.
The utilitarian approach, therefore, suggests that we are doing
too much rather than too little for the benefit of future generations.123
This leads to the interesting implication that a utilitarian might be
more likely to favor a more present-oriented fiscal policy than a Rawl-
sian might be.  Lacking data on relative marginal utilities, of course,
the utilitarian would still not be able to say more than that some redis-
tribution from the future to the present could be justified (short of
strict equality of outcomes, which would be required if all personal
utility functions were identical), but that would still be a significant
step forward because it would suggest not only that there is a moral
obligation between generations but that the appropriate way to meet
that moral obligation is to balance material well-being across genera-
tions.  Strict utilitarianism thus offers a basis not present in Rawlsian
analysis for affirmatively choosing to reorient current fiscal policy
away from investment and toward consumption.124
I should emphasize that I am neither endorsing nor rejecting utili-
tarian analysis as a method for assessing social policy—though it is
probably by now clear that I view the approach with some skepticism.
Rather, the interesting conclusion here is that a very standard utilita-
rian analysis seems to argue against the conventional wisdom that we
are doing too little for future generations.  If we are to conclude that
we owe more to future generations than we have already provided,
the justification must come either from altering the assumptions of the
utilitarian approach or using a different approach altogether.
121 See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
122 See Shaviro, supra note 28, at 1332 (“Recall the scenario whereby the fiscal gap gener-
ates not only very high tax rates but also a capital-market meltdown.”)
123 It is, of course, quite simple to alter a utilitarian framework to include intergenerational
altruism (or any other concern).  For example, if one simply asserts that current generations
include in their utility functions “the material well-being of future generations,” and if one fur-
ther assumes that increases in this variable increase the utility of current generations with suffi-
cient weight, then there is no barrier to concluding that intergenerational utility could be
maximized by moving resources from current to future generations.  This approach, however,
simply assumes its own conclusion.
124 But see Tyler Cowen, Caring About the Distant Future: Why It Matters and What It
Means, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 5, 16 (2007) (arguing for a “[p]rinciple of [g]rowth,” under which
policy should “maximize the rate of sustainable economic growth”).
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E. Inadvertent Intergenerational Generosity
The analysis above thus leads to a surprising and potentially un-
settling conclusion: we might want to make the deliberate choice to
lower the living standards of future generations in order to raise cur-
rent living standards.  Because future Americans are highly likely to
have much higher living standards than current Americans, we are ar-
guably moving in the wrong direction when we call for current sacri-
fice in the name of intergenerational justice.
Even if we take that conclusion seriously, however, there might
be reasons not rooted in theories of intergenerational justice that jus-
tify the enactment of policies that help both current and future gener-
ations.  If so, then we might find ourselves in the odd position where
thinking in intergenerational terms would actually lead to policies that
would make future generations worse off, whereas thinking “selfishly”
could lead to policies that make future generations better off.  Three
such possibilities are described below.
1. Avoiding Economic Crises
As discussed above, the literature on generational accounting is
frequently presented in very long time frames and with explicit refer-
ence to our obligations to future generations.125  Nevertheless, one of
the motivating concerns about the path of fiscal policy that the gener-
ational accounts try to capture is the notion of sustainability.126  Re-
cent estimates of the fiscal gap have been in the range of $40–$70
trillion dollars.127  While there are reasons that those estimates might
be too high or too low (if one concedes in the first place that the
generational accounting approach provides a meaningful guideline to
policy), the key warning raised by those numbers is that there is any
gap at all.  If there is a gap, then the current path of fiscal policy is
unsustainable.  The magnitude of the estimates then becomes impor-
tant to determine how much fiscal tightening must be undertaken to
bring the fiscal system into long-term balance.
The fact of unsustainability, if it is indeed a fact, means that the
planned path of borrowing and spending must be changed.  Until such
changes are made, the economy might start to react to the imbalance
slowly or suddenly.  If it reacts slowly, interest rates begin to rise as
125 See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
126 See, e.g., Auerbach, Gokhale & Kotlikoff, supra note 35, at 93; Shaviro, supra note 28, at
1289.
127 Shaviro, supra note 28, at 1298–99, 1299 n.6.
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the financial markets respond to excess borrowing by the federal gov-
ernment.  The higher rates change the behavior of private actors, and
we hope that it would change the behavior of government deci-
sionmakers at that point as well.  This is why it is often said that tax
cuts today are tax increases in the future.  Fiscal choices must always
be paid for eventually.
When the reaction to long-term imbalances is slow and poten-
tially remediable through changes in policies in intervening years, the
intergenerational tradeoff—and thus the question of what we owe fu-
ture generations—is presented squarely by a potential fiscal gap.  We
can make choices now that increase the fiscal gap and hope, if we are
unconcerned about any generations but our own, that the day of reck-
oning will come after we are gone.  We will, though, do so only be-
cause we are willing to take something away from future generations
for ourselves.  Whether those future generations are likely to be sig-
nificantly better off in the first place, as discussed above, has nothing
to do with this approach to understanding fiscal policy.  Intergenera-
tional justice is front and center.
What if the unsustainable fiscal policy causes a sudden adjust-
ment rather than a gradual one?  A financial market collapse, perhaps
centered around a currency crisis, is one possibility raised by a number
of commentators who are concerned about U.S. fiscal solvency.128  The
possibility of a sudden and violent adjustment in response to fiscal
unsustainability exists from the moment that we enact policies that are
no longer sustainable.  Thus, if the estimates of the fiscal gap that have
been published over the last decade or so have been correct, our fiscal
policy has been and continues to be unsustainable, and the only ques-
tion is when we will be forced to change.  We have been lucky so far,
according to this view, but our luck might run out slowly or at a mo-
ment’s notice.
128 See, e.g., id. at 1326–27 (“[P]otentially even worse, however, is the scenario of fiscal
distress experienced recently by such countries as Brazil and Argentina.  Governments that are
unable to meet their outstanding commitments in any politically tolerable way are prone to
respond by printing money, thereby generating hyper-inflation.  This in itself can be economi-
cally destructive, for example, by increasing financial uncertainty and forcing the use of barter
rather than money.  Even before hyper-inflation emerges, however, nominal interest rates may
skyrocket as soon as financial markets begin to anticipate it as a likely response.  Moreover, real
interest rates may skyrocket even if the government initially resists the temptation to print
money, leading to recession (because fewer business investments can meet the hurdle rate from
borrowing) and making the temptation all the greater.  Thus, actual government default becomes
ever more likely because cheap borrowing to float the annual budget deficit is no longer an
option.”).
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If policymakers became convinced that they must act immedi-
ately in order to avoid a crisis and a potential economic meltdown of
historic proportions, they would enact a set of policies that would, by
assumption, be growth-inducing in the long run because they would
reduce crowding out in the financial markets and thus would increase
investment and the growth of GDP per capita.  This would mean that
we would be enacting policies that are in our own best interest, as
determined by our newfound unwillingness to risk the financial crisis
about which we have been warned.  That this change in policy would
also benefit future generations would be purely incidental.  Therefore,
a policy that makes us currently better off might also be growth-induc-
ing, but it need not have been enacted as a result of any sense of
obligation to future generations.  We might feel good about ourselves,
knowing that we are also making our children and grandchildren bet-
ter off, but we did not go through a process where we convinced our-
selves to give something up on behalf of someone else.  There was no
tradeoff.
2. Avoiding Political Crises
A second argument that involves making growth-inducing policy
choices for reasons that are not, at least in the first instance, motivated
by intergenerational concerns involves the potential benefits of eco-
nomic growth on the social and political culture.  Benjamin Friedman
makes a compelling argument that we need to allow the economy to
grow at some positive rate sufficient to prevent the least advantaged
in society from becoming so disengaged from the economy and society
that they have no stake in continuing the status quo.129
The most direct motivation for this argument is clearly Nazi Ger-
many, where the economic sanctions and constraints imposed by the
victors of World War I led to economic crises in Germany (including a
historic hyperinflation) that paved the way for Hitler’s rise and the
horrors that followed.130  Similarly, the strongest showing that the
Communist Party ever made in the United States was during the
Great Depression.  The creation of large numbers of desperate, angry
former workers clearly raised the danger that the system could col-
lapse.131  If this story is true, and it does have a great deal of explana-
tory power, the New Deal programs that mitigated the pain for
129 BENJAMIN M. FRIEDMAN, THE MORAL CONSEQUENCES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 79–102
(2005).
130 See id. at 267–94.
131 See id. at 147–48.
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unemployed and desperate Americans might be what saved capitalism
in the United States.
There are, of course, less dramatic connections between poor eco-
nomic performance and political and social unrest.  Friedman admit-
tedly cannot quantify exactly how bad things can become
economically before the world becomes a more dangerous place.  It is
also possible that people will not respond to the same variables at
different times, with inflation being sufficient to ignite unrest at some
times but not at others, and economic contraction leading to crises in
some contexts but not others.  More abstractly, even if people are re-
acting to a particular variable (such as the rate of growth of GDP per
capita), they might begin to take growth at some levels for granted
and become dissatisfied unless the economy grows faster.  In other
words, they might stop responding to the level of a variable and in-
stead look to its rate of growth, or they might not respond to its rate
of growth but only respond to acceleration of the variable.
Such mathematical variations are interesting, to be sure, but the
conclusion seems to be that unrest can be avoided with some positive
growth rate in GDP that is associated with reasonable stability in
prices and reasonably good job prospects for those who wish to work.
This is an argument for at least a mildly interventionist set of mone-
tary and fiscal policies, with government officials at least committing
themselves to stepping in when the economy starts to look too shaky
for too long.  Chances are, of course, that a minimally functioning rep-
resentative democracy would generally produce such a policy regime.
As above, though, the distinction here is that such a policy regime
would make sense even if we were completely unconcerned about the
prospects of future generations.  Those who follow us would inherit a
richer economy than their parents had inherited, which might well
make them happy.  No calculations about how to trade off the present
against the future, however, were necessary.
In short, it could well be that there are incentives in place that
will cause us to provide a rosy future for recently born and not-yet-
born generations notwithstanding any debates about intergenerational
obligations.  If the analysis later in this Article were to cause anyone
to wonder whether we need to have growth, it is well to recall that
there are other reasons to make an economy grow besides our con-
cern for our grandchildren.  If we are going to think explicitly about
those future people, though, the guidance from the available analyti-
cal frameworks is surprisingly limited.
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IV. Distributive Justice and Long-Term Fiscal Issues
The discussion in the previous two sections has led to two tenta-
tive conclusions.  First, given that living standards are likely to be
higher in the future than they are today, there is not only no apparent
reason for current generations to feel guilty about harming their chil-
dren and grandchildren but, in fact, they should probably be fulfilling
their own desires more and saving less for their heirs because future
generations will likely be much better off than are today’s adults (at
least as measured in standard economic terms) even without addi-
tional investments in future economic capacity.  Second, even if cur-
rent generations are completely selfish and thus do not take into
account the interests of future generations when formulating eco-
nomic policies, we are still likely to adopt policies that end up making
future generations better off, notwithstanding whether or not we care
to do so.
For those who might feel uncomfortable with the idea that we
have already done enough for future generations or who are unwilling
to imagine that we might, in essence, blunder our way into a more
prosperous future, the analysis can be expanded in a number of direc-
tions.  First, we can look beyond the borders of the United States and
note that many regions around the world are not nearly as economi-
cally prosperous as we are.132  Although such an analysis is likely to
suggest that we should be spending more now to bring the world up to
something like Rawls’s minimum acceptable level rather than saving
to increase future living standards, an international analysis would
certainly look very different from one based on forecasts of high and
rising U.S. living standards.  Second, it is possible to expand our focus
beyond traditional measures of economic living standards and bring
back into the analysis issues such as environmental justice.  As dis-
cussed earlier, the environmental dimension could radically alter our
132 Press Release, International Labour Organization, New ILO Report Says US Leads the
World in Labour Productivity, Some Regions Are Catching Up, Most Lag Behind (Sept. 2,
2007), available at http://www.ilo.org/global/About_the_ILO/Media_and_public_information/
Press_releases/lang—en/WCMS_083976/index.htm (“[According to a new report,] 1.5 billion
people in the world—or one-third of the working-age population—are ‘potentially underutil-
ized.’  This new estimate of labour underutilization is comprised of the 195.7 million unemployed
people in the world and nearly 1.3 billion working poor who live with their families on less than
US$ 2 per day per family member.  Whereas the unemployed want to work but lack the opportu-
nity to do so, the working poor are working but do not earn enough to escape poverty.  The
report also estimates that half of all women and men employed are considered vulnerable to
poverty.”)
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views about whether current policies are helping or harming future
generations.
It is not, however, necessary to move beyond traditional mea-
sures of economic well-being to expand the analysis in useful direc-
tions.133  Even continuing to set aside non-domestic concerns and non-
economic issues like environmental justice, analysis of intergenera-
tional obligations can be enriched and significantly transformed by
thinking about intergenerational issues applying concepts of distribu-
tive justice to questions of poverty within and across generations.  The
analysis to this point, after all, has treated each generation as an undif-
ferentiated whole, with average GDP per capita used as a measure of
how one generation’s well-being compares to another’s.  Given that
incomes within a living generation are unequal, we can and should ask
whether the concepts of distributive justice that are typically applied
to intragenerational analysis can tell us anything useful about in-
tergenerational obligations.
The question of intergenerational justice can thus be analyzed not
only by comparing average living standards across time but by disag-
gregating living standards within current and future generations.  The
more committed we are to egalitarian principles, the more important
it is to focus on the living standards of the poorest people at any given
time rather than relying on averages.
Distributive justice has, in fact, been the focus of the analysis all
along.  Comparing the living standards of current versus future gener-
ations is fundamentally a matter of asking whether economic well-be-
ing is likely to be distributed fairly across generations.  We need only
expand this question to look at intragenerational distributive justice
and then combine the intra- and intergenerational perspectives to em-
brace a more comprehensive approach to distributive justice.  Those
who worry about our obligations to future generations are focused too
narrowly on only one dimension of distributive justice, but this is not
the same as the familiar move of focusing on efficiency while setting
distributive issues aside entirely.134  We are all distributivists now.
133 As noted above, I plan to write a sequel to the current article in which I will expand the
analysis to address concerns of environmental damage and global poverty.  The goal in the pre-
sent article is to explore what can be learned when we limit ourselves to traditional economic
measures.
134 See, e.g., Kaplow, supra note 53, at 99 (arguing that “in principle, intergenerational effi-
ciency should be pursued independently of how questions of intergenerational distributive jus-
tice are answered”).
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A. “Average” People Are Not Average
The distribution of income or wealth over a given time period is a
relatively simple matter of comparing people within an economy and
describing the statistical facts about the distribution.  People can be
divided into population quintiles, deciles, or any other arbitrary
breakdown and their incomes or levels of wealth compared.135  The
income distribution in the United States shows the richest quintile ac-
counting for over half of all income earned in recent years.136
Even without breaking incomes into income groups, it is possible
to see distributional differences by comparing the median income in
an economy with the mean income.  In 2006, for example, the median
income in the United States was $48,201, while the mean income was
$66,570.137  Similarly, median household income rose by 0.7% from
2005 to 2006,138 while mean or per capita household income rose by
1.9%.139  Because “[u]nlike medians, per capita and means are af-
fected by high incomes,”140 the larger increase in per capita income
flows from the increases among high income earners.
To illustrate, if three people have incomes of $25,000, $50,000,
and $75,000 in one year and $25,000, $50,000, and $750,000 the next,
the median income in both years is $50,000, while per capita income
jumps from $50,000 in the first year to $275,000 in the second.  Only
one person is better off, but that ten-fold increase in income pulls up
the average dramatically.
Something essentially similar has been happening in the United
States over the last few years and, to a certain extent, over the last few
decades.  For example, although the median income rose from 2005 to
2006, “this merely brought median income back to where it stood in
the 2001 recession year.”141  During those years (2001–06), per capita
GDP rose by a total of roughly nine percent,142 implying that the
135 See, e.g., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVER-
AGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2006, at 7 (2007), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2007pubs/
p60-233.pdf (the Census Bureau “ranks households from lowest to highest on the basis of in-
come and then divides them into groups of equal population size, typically quintiles”).
136 Id. at 5 tbl.1 (showing the highest quintile with 50.4% of income in 2005 and 50.5% in
2006).
137 Id. at 29 tbl.A-1.
138 Id. at 4.
139 Id. at 10.
140 Id. at 10 n.22.
141 CTR. ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF AMERICANS
WHO ARE UNINSURED CLIMBS AGAIN 1 (2007), http://www.cbpp.org/files/8-28-07pov.pdf.
142 Computations by author based on Department of Labor data. See OFFICE OF PRODUC-
TIVITY AND TECH., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, COMPARATIVE REAL GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT
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growth in the economy since the last recession has only raised the
living standards of those with higher incomes.
Over a longer time horizon, the changes in median income across
different income groups have reflected an increasing concentration of
income at the top of the distribution.  For example, household income
for families at the 80th percentile was $61,077 in 1967 and rose to
$97,032 in 2007, an increase of 58.9%.143  On the other hand, median
household income rose 30.8% from to $36,847 to $48,201 while in-
come for families at the 20th percentile rose 29.5% from $15,476 to
$20,035.144
It is, therefore, possible that the economy can grow without actu-
ally increasing the living standards of large numbers of Americans at
all over short periods, while it is similarly possible that growth over
long periods does not filter to everyone equally.  One could still argue
that we need even higher growth to raise the incomes of middle- and
lower-class Americans, but it is much more plausible to focus directly
on the income distribution and to make it a policy goal to redistribute
income rather than to continue to hope that GDP growth will trickle
down to all income levels.  Indeed, some economists who were once
focused on increasing growth are now looking explicitly at reducing
inequality.145
My argument here is that we must include in our discussions of
income inequality an explicit concern with income inequality over
time, including a comparison of how policies will affect the rich and
the poor at different times.  Even without that combination of intra-
and intergenerational distributive justice analysis, though, it bears
mentioning that Benjamin Friedman’s argument noted above (to the
effect that increases in economic well-being are an essential element
of maintaining social and political stability) clearly must presume that
economic growth is widely shared, because social peace is hardly
likely to be preserved in a new gilded age where a few at the top get
richer while everyone else’s incomes lag behind.  Pursuing annual in-
PER CAPITA AND PER EMPLOYED PERSON: 16 COUNTRIES 1960–2007, at 11 tbl.1 (2008), http://
www.bls.gov/fls/flsgdp.pdf.
143 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN
THE UNITED STATES: 2006, at 38–39 tbl.A-3 (2007), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/
2007pubs/p60-233.pdf (using income in 2006 inflation-adjusted dollars).
144 Id.
145 See Matt Bai, The Poverty Platform, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2007, § 6 (Magazine), at 66, 69
(describing Stanford economist Paul Romer, “one of the world’s leading theorists on economic
growth,” who “has changed his focus [to] . . .  the next great challenge in American economics:
mitigating inequality”).
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creases in economic output for our own good, therefore, requires that
any gains be widely distributed if not actually deliberately aimed to-
ward the lower rungs of the income ladder.
B. Intergenerational Justice as a Distributive Matter
The variation in incomes within generations is much, much
greater (even within a wealthy country like the United States) than
variations in average income levels even over the course of a very
good century or three.146  Comparing the United States to the rest of
the world only sharpens the point.  It is therefore essential to disaggre-
gate each generation’s income levels and to compare the positions of
various representatives of each generation in making fiscal policy
decisions.
Adding an intergenerational dimension to the distributive analy-
sis of economic outcomes appears at first glance to add a complicating
dimension, forcing us to think not only about differences in income at
any point in time but about differences in income over time as well.
Fortunately, however, the analysis simplifies nicely.  Rather than
thinking about intergenerational differences in income as categorically
different from intragenerational differences, all income compari-
sons—even those between people at different points in time—should
be analyzed in the same way.  Distributional analysis across time is
then no different from more familiar forms of distributional analysis,
and the questions (though hardly easy) at least become familiar.147
146 This assertion, though stated somewhat playfully, is not an exaggeration.  Imagine that
an economy were to grow at a four percent annual rate, which would be historically unprece-
dented. See Lester Thurow, A Chinese Century? Maybe It’s the Next One, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19,
2007, § 3, at 4 (“A 4 percent rate is faster than any big country has ever grown for 100 years.”).
Assuming further that this translated to a 3 percent growth rate on a per capita basis, this would
mean that per capita GDP would double in 24 years and double again every 24 years thereafter,
because of the effects of compound growth.  Even at that rate, GDP per capita would be slightly
less than 20 times higher after a century, meaning that someone currently earning $20,000 per
year would be able to earn (if they were still alive and in the same job) just under $400,000 in a
year.  After two more centuries of unprecedented growth, the $20,000 per year worker would
earn almost $142 million annually.  This would almost cover the distance between the current
working poor and corporate chief executives but still leave the future worker’s income at a frac-
tion of the current incomes of hedge fund managers. Cf. Michael K. Ozanian & Peter J.
Schwartz, Top Guns, FORBES, May 21, 2007, at 102, 102, available at http://www.forbes.com/
free_forbes/2007/0521/102.html (“Reaping the rewards of percentage fees, the 20 top Wall Street
fund managers earned an average of $658 million in 2006 versus $145 million for the 20 highest-
paid chief executives.  It’s almost enough to think the chiefs ought to ask for a raise.  James
Simons, who owns an estimated 40% of Renaissance Technologies, sits atop our list with earn-
ings of $1.5 billion.”).
147 Kaplow makes a similar claim that intergenerational analysis is in certain instances not
significantly different from intragenerational analyses. See Kaplow, supra note 53 at 115–16.
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For example, if we are currently considering a policy that redis-
tributes income from future generations to the current generation, we
would want to know who in the current generation will gain and who
in later generations will lose.  If the loss in income in the future were
to be equal across the board while the present gain would accrue only
to the richest members of the current generation, it borders on the
absurd to justify such a policy by appealing to the diminishing margi-
nal utility of “richer” future generations or to rely on any other notion
of distributive justice to justify what is in fact an upward redistribution
of income.  Poor and middle-class people in the future would be subsi-
dizing the lifestyles of the current rich and famous.
Moving to a realistic example, consider policies that have been
proposed to “save” Social Security by raising taxes on current workers
or to reduce benefits payments to current retirees.148  If the Social Se-
curity Trust Fund is ultimately depleted, it will be necessary either to
cut benefits for future retirees, to raise taxes on future citizens, or to
engage in deficit spending (which pushes the cost onto citizens in the
more distant future).  Even if future policymakers immediately reduce
benefits to retirees in the year of depletion, it turns out that the neces-
sary cuts would still leave future retirees (who will have spent their
lives earning more than current retirees earned, on average) with
higher inflation-adjusted retirement benefits than current retirees re-
ceive.149  As a distributive matter, therefore, cutting benefits today to
preserve benefits in the future would amount to a regressive shift in
income from a relatively poor group to a relatively rich one.
Similarly, a plan to increase taxes today in order to preserve ben-
efit levels for Social Security in the future—or to make tax increases
in the future unnecessary—can only be judged if one knows whose
taxes are being raised and whose taxes are being cut.  It would be
possible to raise taxes today on the highest income earners in order to
finance Social Security benefits in the future, which would be distribu-
tionally progressive.  Raising payroll taxes today, by contrast, would
be regressive in that it would tax only wage income today in order to
finance the benefits of richer people in the future or—as an even more
regressive possibility—making it unnecessary to raise income taxes in
Although he focuses on a point not directly relevant here, he suggests that “accepted principles
of policy analysis developed in the intragenerational context carry over” to inform his analysis.
See id. at 116.  Matthew Adler makes an argument with similar implications, as I discuss below.
See infra notes 153–155 and accompanying text.
148 See generally Buchanan, When Should We Worry?, supra note 79, at 258–62; NANCY J.
ALTMAN, THE BATTLE FOR SOCIAL SECURITY: FROM FDR’S VISION TO BUSH’S GAMBLE (2005).
149 See Buchanan, Long-Term Deficits, supra note 3, at 299–301, 314–15.
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the future (potential tax increases that could be targeted to the highest
income earners in a future filled with relatively high income
earners).150
The most promising way out of the intergenerational balancing
question, then, is simply to view the question of intergenerational jus-
tice as equivalent to questions of intragenerational justice.  While it is
likely in some instances to be more difficult to make predictions about
the distributive impacts of policies on future generations, we can at
least look at whatever data are available to guide our policy choices.
As a starting point for evaluating any policy, we would compare the
distributive effects of each policy option both currently and in the fu-
ture, using the same (admittedly imperfect) tools that we currently use
to assess distributive justice.
It is surely true, of course, that we have not yet succeeded in
agreeing how progressive the tax system should be (or even whether
that is the right way to think about distributive justice151), but there is
something to be gained by not having to invent a separate theory of
justice when confronting intergenerational questions.  Familiar contro-
versies regarding the possible disincentive effects of tax policies,152
etc., would still be relevant, as would questions of poverty thresholds,
steepness of progressive rate structures, and so on.  As the discussion
of Social Security proposals above demonstrates, however, even if we
lack definitive theories of ideal progressivity, we can still use distribu-
tive measures to inform policy debates.
An alternative approach would be to refuse to continue to muck
around with the current seemingly unresolvable debates over progres-
sivity, etc.—and certainly to refuse to extend that frustrating philo-
sophical standoff into a new dimension of policy analysis.  Instead, we
might want to take the opportunity to break out of our current politi-
150 As I have argued elsewhere, the payroll tax increases passed by Congress in 1983 were a
relatively regressive tax policy in that they made it unnecessary to rely on the much more pro-
gressive federal income tax to prevent shortfalls in funding Social Security. See Neil H.
Buchanan, The Trillion-Dollar Breach of Contract: Social Security and the American Worker
(Aug. 30, 2001), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20010830_buchanan.html.  In light of
the highly regressive tax cuts of 2001 and 2003, raising payroll taxes even further today would
amount to a decision to pile one regressive tax increase on top of another in order to finance
regressive tax cuts.
151 See LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP 131–32 (2002) (not-
ing the shortcomings of discussing progressivity “in terms of traditional tax equity standards
alone, rather than in terms of larger standards of societal justice”).
152 Every public finance textbook includes extensive discussions of tax “distortions,” i.e.,
the effects of taxes on economic behavior. See, e.g., JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, ECONOMICS OF THE
PUBLIC SECTOR 518–49 (3d ed. 2000).
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cal and philosophical stalemate and force ourselves finally to find a
satisfactory social welfare function which we would then use to deter-
mine optimal distribution of incomes and other measures of well-be-
ing.  Matthew Adler offers a particularly nice summary of the variants
of welfare consequentialism within the current literature on income
distribution,153 using that discussion to demonstrate that, even in a
welfare consequentialist framework, it is possible for adherents of any
of the three versions of non-utilitarianism to favor policies that do not
maximize economic growth over time.154  He thus concludes that even
if we are willing to narrow our philosophical analysis to one limited
class of social welfare theories, it is still necessary to “do the hard,
philosophical work of figuring out which specific social welfare func-
tion policymakers should use.”155
Adler does immediately note, however, that it is possible to see
the determination of a social welfare function as “an irreducibly sub-
jective matter, appropriate for legislatures rather than scholars,”
where the ultimate decision about intergenerational policies must be
made through the political process.156  This seems right not only as a
predictive matter (that is, because it seems unlikely that more “hard,
philosophical work” on social welfare functions will produce signifi-
cant breakthroughs, especially in the political arena) but as a practical
matter as well.  Even as scholars try to sort through the arguments
regarding social welfare functions and discern the implications of
those arguments for policy, decisions are being made with both in-
tragenerational and intergenerational implications.  We might be able
to make some improvements in our policy analysis if we can move
away from the belief that intergenerational welfare comparisons are
fundamentally different from intragenerational comparisons and if we
use that as an opening to introduce distributive justice issues more
directly into the analysis of fiscal policies.
153 In addition to utilitarianism, Adler describes Prioritarianism, which gives “greater
weight to changes in well-being that affect individuals who are worse off.”  Adler, supra note 58,
at 44.  At its, extreme Prioritarianism becomes the “leximin” principle—an application of the
principle in which policies are chosen strictly on the basis of their effects on the poorest mem-
bers of society. Id. at 44 n.16.  Comparativism expands the analysis to the effects of policy
changes on other individuals beyond those directly affected by a policy, and Sufficientism gives
“greater weight, or perhaps absolute priority, to welfare changes that affect individuals below
some well-being threshold.” Id. at 44–45.
154 Id. at 45.
155 Id. at 47.
156 See id.
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C. Combining the “Better Than Me” Standard with Distributive
Justice
We could, therefore, improve our understanding of fiscal policy
proposals by focusing on distributive questions both within and across
generations.  Adopting this approach would, moreover, have an addi-
tional advantage if we were to use it as a starting point to bring distri-
butional concerns into discussions of our obligations to future
generations.  For example, even if we simply adopted a simple version
of the “better than me” approach to intergenerational justice, we
would be a step ahead if we looked at generational income distribu-
tions and turned “better than me” into something like “better than
our current median.”  That is, recasting intergenerational obligations
as distributive obligations would highlight that some children have
parents whose incomes are low and whose life situations are ex-
tremely disadvantaged.  Proceeding from a shared goal that everyone
should do better than their parents could be an entre´e into an argu-
ment about the profound disadvantages that weigh on the children of
poor parents.  We should not allow inequalities to pass across genera-
tions simply by being satisfied that children whose parents were at the
bottom of the economic barrel might manage to nudge past their
parents.
Wanting our children to do better than we have done can thus
become a starting point for saying that no child should do worse than
some minimum standard, where that minimum standard is determined
by reference to the entire society rather than to the circumstances of
one’s parents.  Adopting such an approach could shine a better light
on inequality, allowing us to use the most viscerally appealing argu-
ment for intergenerational justice and to apply it with a clear focus on
distribution.
To be clear, the analysis above suggests that we must not only
evaluate all fiscal policy proposals on the basis of their distributional
impact (both within and across generations) but that we should reject
any proposal that says nothing more than: “We should change our ec-
onomic policies for the benefit of future generations.”  That argument,
standing alone, is not enough to justify a change in policy that would
take from current generations for the benefit of future generations,
especially given the projections of future economic growth discussed
above.  Even without strong growth in the future, moreover, the best
argument that we owe more to future generations starts with a distri-
butional concern that says that children—all children—have the right
1296 The George Washington Law Review [Vol. 77:1237
to start life above (or at least at) the level that currently living people
consider to be a bare minimum.
V. Conclusions
Virtually every area of social and economic policy can be viewed
through the lens of intergenerational obligations.  What must current
generations do to provide a minimally decent world for future genera-
tions?  Do they owe anything at all?  If so, how should we balance the
interests of current and future generations?
In this Article, I briefly summarized some of the literature on in-
tergenerational justice, showing that the threshold question of
whether there are any intergenerational obligations is a surprisingly
difficult one.  In the course of that discussion, I identified a number of
important issues that are implicated by broad questions of intergener-
ational justice, including questions of environmental preservation,
population levels, etc.  The issues implicated by intergenerational con-
cerns can be cast as broadly as the imagination allows.
Having discussed just how broad the issues can be, I then asked
whether we might at least be able to reach some simple conclusions
about intergenerational justice if we strictly limit ourselves to analyz-
ing one comparatively narrow issue—budgetary policy over time—
and asking only whether there is a generationally equitable way to
determine the balance between consumption for the present and in-
vestment for the future.  This analysis is particularly important in light
of the forecasts showing much higher living standards for future
Americans.  (This approach thus begins by temporarily setting aside
important questions about whether the statistics underlying these
forecasts accurately measure genuine well-being, accepting only for
the sake of argument that there is a meaningful correlation between
economic growth and quality of life.)  The surprising conclusion is that
there are, if anything, fairly plausible arguments that we are doing too
much for future generations in terms of ensuring long-term economic
growth, not too little.  Feeling some discomfort with this conclusion, I
then discussed how we might actually do better by future generations
if we simply focused on present-oriented concerns, specifically: avoid-
ing fiscal crises, maintaining political stability, and weighing policies
from a distributive viewpoint.
Paradoxically, therefore, approaching fiscal policy questions from
an explicitly intergenerational perspective leads to conclusions that
might lead us to lower the measured living standards of future genera-
tions.  We might do better by our grandchildren simply by enacting
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responsible policies that improve our current situation; and to the ex-
tent that we are able to expand our focus from average living stan-
dards to encompass distributional concerns, treating intergenerational
issues in the same way that we treat equity questions within a genera-
tion is a potentially more promising approach to formulating fiscal
policy.  I thus conclude that we might end up doing both current and
future generations a favor by thinking less about the future and more
about the present.
In short, I reach two related conclusions.  First, and quite surpris-
ingly, if we are concerned only about present versus future median
living standards, we are already doing very, very well by future gener-
ations.  Second, we should also be concerned about the distribution of
living standards.  The distribution of income and wealth both cur-
rently and in the future is grossly and unacceptably unbalanced.
Quite simply, the gap between rich and poor is too large and the
depths of poverty are too extreme.  We should, moreover, be con-
cerned about distributive justice both currently and across genera-
tions, moving resources away from those with the most and toward
those with the least, whenever those people might be alive.  If we are
to be good stewards of the future, we must also be good stewards of
the present.
Ultimately, therefore, I take a pragmatic position.  Recasting in-
tergenerational issues as questions of distributive justice provides an
opportunity to improve policy analysis and social equality.  We should
make the most of this opportunity to improve policy analysis—for
ourselves and for future generations.
